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The Influenza, 1890 
(excerpts) 
 
By Winston Churchill, 1890 
 
 
Oh how shall I its deeds recount, 
Or measure the untold amount 
Of ills that it has done? 
From China's bright celestial land 
E'en to Arabia's thirsty sand 
It journeyed with the sun. 
 
O'er miles of bleak Siberia's plains 
Where Russian exiles toil in chains 
It moved with noiseless tread; 
And as it slowly glided by 
There followed it across the sky 
The spirits of the dead. 
 
The Ural peaks by it were scaled 
And every bar and barrier failed 
To turn it from its way; 
Slowly and surely on it came, 
Heralded by its awful fame, 
Increasing day by day. 
 
On Moscow's fair and famous town 
Where fell the first Napoleon's crown 
It made a direful swoop; 
The rich, the poor, the high, the low 
Alike the various symptoms know, 













Multiple pandemics, numerous outbreaks, thousands of lives lost and billions 
of dollars of national income wiped out – all since the turn of this century, in 
barely 17 years – and yet the world’s investments in pandemic preparedness 
and response remain woefully inadequate. We know by now that the world 
will see another pandemic in the not-too-distant future; that random 
mutations occur often enough in microbes that help them survive and adapt; 
that new pathogens will inevitably find a way to break through our defenses; 
and that there is the increased potential for intentional or accidental release 
of a synthesized agent. Every expert commentary and every analysis in recent 
years tells us that the costs of inaction are immense. And yet, as the havoc 
caused by the last outbreak turns into a fading memory, we become 
complacent and relegate the case for investing in preparedness on a back 
burner, only to bring it to the forefront when the next outbreak occurs. The 
result is that the world remains scarily vulnerable.  
 
In the wake of Ebola, a number of commissions and panels made 
recommendations about how the world could be better prepared to prevent, 
identify, contain, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. All these 
reviews – including the one I chaired for the U.S. National Academy of 
Medicine – agreed on three key priorities: strengthening preparedness at a 
national level; improving coordination and capabilities at a regional and 
global level; and accelerating R&D in this arena. Over the last twelve months 
we have seen some important steps taken, such as the creation of the Health 
Emergencies Program at the World Health Organization (WHO), the launch 
of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), and the 
establishment of the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility 
(PEF). Many countries have signed up for external evaluations of their 
preparedness and response systems, signaling a welcome openness and 
willingness to collectively identify problem areas and explore solutions. Yet 
this also presents a challenge. Countries that develop detailed plans to 
reinforce their disease surveillance, diagnostic services, infection control, 
emergency preparedness, etc. in the wake of these assessments will become 
rapidly disillusioned if there is no money available to translate these plans into 
reality. 
 
Any individual or government that has had direct experience of an epidemic 
or pandemic does not need convincing of the case for investing in pandemic 
preparedness. The cruel statistic of lives lost is only the first measure of 
impact. To that must be added the cost to the broader economy and to society 
as a whole. Pandemics cause enormous economic disruption and can quickly 
undermine communities and governance. Responding to outbreaks once they 
have happened is far more expensive – in lives and money – than investing in 
preparedness. 
 
Yet in many countries the argument has not been won. Governments struggle 
to reconcile limited resources with many competing priorities. Health does 
not always rank as one of the top budget priorities, and within health 
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spending, pandemic preparedness is often overlooked in favor of more 
immediate and visible goals.  
 
To address this challenge, an International Working Group on Financing 
Preparedness was created in November 2016. This Group, which I chair, 
comprises experts and leaders from multilateral organizations, academia, 
philanthropic institutions, governments and businesses. The objective of the 
International Working Group is to propose ways in which national 
governments and development partners can ensure adequate and sustainable 
financing for actions to strengthen pandemic preparedness and thus enable 
effective compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR) as well 
as World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) standards. Our primary focus 
is on the prevention, identification, and containment of infectious disease 
outbreaks, so we have concentrated on the financing of critical capacities such 
as disease surveillance systems, laboratory networks, and emergency 
operations centers, as well as “One Health” initiatives designed to protect 
people from pathogens in the animal population. We also recognize the crucial 
importance of supporting health systems strengthening as a key investment in 
preparedness. 
 
For many countries, the starting point in assessing what needs to be financed 
will be the results of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or outcome of a 
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) pathway analysis. The recently 
introduced JEE process is a huge step forward. It provides a systematic and 
objective assessment of a country’s capabilities across core domains, plus a 
prioritized list of gaps to be addressed. But of course, a good diagnostic is only 
the first step. We want the outcomes of these evaluations to be translated into 
adequately funded action plans that countries can implement. And it is crucial 
that the financing is sustained: investing in preparedness is not a one-off, but 
an ongoing requirement. 
 
The scope of our investigation includes domestic resource mobilization, 
development assistance, and private sector engagement. For many countries, 
financing preparedness through the domestic public sector budget is the best 
way to ensure sustained funding and seamless integration with the rest of the 
health system. Yet this requires ensuring sufficient priority is attached to 
investing in pandemic preparedness in budget allocations. In some cases, it 
may also require enhancing fiscal mobilization or attracting direct financing 
from the private sector. For many countries, especially the poorest and most 
fragile, there is clearly a role for international development assistance in 
reinforcing pandemic preparedness. Here, the challenge is to ensure such 
contributions are effectively coordinated and prioritized, and that we 
transition to a sustainable funding arrangement, rather than something that 
withers when donor priorities change. 
 
Ensuring sustained commitment to financing preparedness will be difficult, 
since the mark of success is that nothing happens, and there will always be 
multiple competing priorities. In this context, we need to harness the powerful 
incentives that business and the financial markets can provide. We want 
investors and business leaders to be taking account of health risks as they 
decide where to invest and trade. This will reward those countries that have 
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translated their JEE and PVS assessments into implemented action plans, and 
expose those countries which have failed to act. Through developing indices 
that measure intrinsic risk, state of preparedness, and economic vulnerability, 
we can make the threat of infectious disease outbreaks much more visible and 
concrete. This in turn will incentivize governments and the private sector to 
mitigate these risks.  
 
Investing in health security through financing preparedness is a highly cost-
effective way to protect lives and safeguard livelihoods and communities. 
Whether measured in human lives saved or economic disruption avoided, the 
return on investments in pandemic preparedness is extraordinarily high. 
Moreover, many of the capabilities and much of the infrastructure required 
for pandemic preparedness also support efforts to fight endemic diseases and 
counter the threat of antimicrobial resistance. Taken together, the 
recommendations of the International Working Group set out in this report 
represent a pathway towards achieving the goal of universal health security, 
whilst strengthening health systems and helping ensure delivery of the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
 
Peter Sands, Chair 
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Deadly infectious pandemics will mark humanity’s future, as they have shaped 
its past. Neither individual governments nor the global community can 
entirely prevent the emergence of infectious threats. But we can be much 
better prepared. 
 
This report by the International Working Group on Financing Preparedness 
(IWG) proposes ways in which national governments and development 
partners can finance investments in country and regional preparedness and 
response capacities for pandemics and other health emergencies.  
 
Preparedness for pandemics refers to health and non-health interventions, 
capabilities, and capacities at community, country, regional, and global levels. 
Their purpose is to prevent, detect, contain and respond to the spread of 
disease and other hazards, mitigating social disruptions and limiting risks to 
international travel and trade. 
 
The Case for Preparedness 
 
Pandemics cause vast human suffering and devastating economic costs. 
Experts differ in their estimates of the economic cost of pandemics and the 
closely related threat of drug-resistant infections. However, all the figures 
advanced are alarmingly high. Even the most conservative estimates suggest 
that a pandemic could destroy over 1.0 percent of global GDP, comparable to 
other global threats such as climate change. Even much smaller outbreaks can 
cause significant loss of life and immense economic disruption. Investments 
improving preparedness therefore offer an extraordinarily high potential 
return. Yet we invest relatively little in mitigating the risks of infectious 
disease crises relative to what we spend against other risks to human lives and 
livelihoods, such as climate change, war or financial crises.  
 
In countries where there is a reasonably comprehensive and well-functioning 
underlying health system, which would include a number of low-income and 
many middle-income countries, financing improved preparedness might cost 
less than $1 per person per year, not a huge sum compared to the scale of the 
risks to human lives and livelihoods. More advanced economies can and do 
choose to spend much more per person. Achieving improved preparedness in 
countries with fundamental gaps in health coverage and capacities, 
particularly in primary care, will cost more, since preparedness is built on 
these foundations.  
 
In addition to mitigating the risks to human lives and livelihoods from 
infectious disease risks, investing in preparedness has important benefits for 
the broader health system. Many of the capabilities and infrastructure 
required for preparedness are also needed to combat antimicrobial resistance 





The Goal of Preparedness: Universal Health Security 
 
The concept of universal health security best captures the ultimate purpose of 
reinforcing preparedness. At its simplest, health security means protecting 
people from threats to their health. Universal health security means protecting 
everybody, not just because that is the equitable thing to do, but because with 
infectious diseases, true health security can only be achieved if everyone is 
protected. 
 
Achieving universal health security is an essential component of the ultimate 
goal of providing universal health coverage. It both depends on and 
complements broader efforts to strengthen health systems and make them 
more resilient, so needs to be pursued as part of an integrated plan, not as a 
separate silo. When an infectious disease outbreak occurs, health systems 
come under enormous pressure, and other health objectives are often 
compromised, as resources are diverted to contain the outbreak and patients 
avoid seeking care. Better preparedness is key to making health systems more 
resilient. 
 
Achieving Universal Health Security  
 
In this report, we set out 12 specific recommendations to ensure adequate and 
sustained financing of preparedness. The recommendations are integrated 
and interdependent. Together they constitute a unified framework. To be 
effective in achieving universal health security, we need to pursue them all. 
 
Recommendation 1: National governments and development partners should 
commit to a path towards universal health security by adopting and implementing 
the framework set out in this report and embodied in Recommendations 2-12. 
 
Identifying Gaps and Developing a Plan 
 
The first step for countries seeking to strengthen their preparedness is to make 
an accurate assessment of their current state of preparedness and thus to 
identify gaps and resource needs. The Joint External Evaluation mechanism 
(JEE), launched in 2016 by the World Health Organization (WHO), provides 
an effective mechanism for conducting such an assessment. Through a 
combination of peer review and self-assessment, the JEE delivers a systematic 
evaluation of a country’s preparedness capabilities and infrastructure across 
19 domains, enabling clear identification of gaps and areas for improvement. 
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) also has a well-established 
equivalent evaluation mechanism, the Performance of Veterinary Services 
Pathway (PVS), which assesses the quality of national veterinary services and 
animal health systems. Together, the JEE and the PVS provide national 
governments with the essential starting point for any initiative to improve 
preparedness: a detailed and objective assessment of the current status 
against agreed benchmarks.  
 
Recommendation 2: (i) By the end of 2017, all national governments should 
commit to participate in, and by the end of 2019, conduct a Joint External  
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Evaluation (JEE) to assess their capacity to comply with the requirements of the 
International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR) to prevent, detect, and rapidly 
respond to public health threats; (ii) By the end of 2017, all national governments 
should commit to participate in, and by the end of 2019, conduct an evaluation of 
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) to assess their capacity to comply with 
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) standards.  
 
Following the JEE and PVS assessments, the next step is for countries to 
develop a prioritized plan to rectify gaps and remedy weaknesses. To support 
countries in this effort, WHO has developed Guidelines for Development of a 
National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS). The Guidelines outline 
steps for situation analysis, strategic planning and prioritization, costing, 
budget allocation and implementation of the NAPHS. As of the end of April 
2017, three countries – Tanzania, Pakistan and Eritrea – had completed the 
crucial costing phase of their preparedness plans. 
 
For many countries, particularly smaller or island nations, the plan may 
involve extensive regional cooperation. Infectious diseases do not respect 
national boundaries. Cooperation and the sharing of specialist facilities can 
deliver better preparedness and be more cost-effective. 
 
Recommendation 3: Within nine months of completion of JEE and PVS, national 
governments should develop and publish a prioritized and costed plan to 
implement recommendations emerging from the JEE and PVS assessments, 
including regional elements where relevant. 
 
Devising a Financing Proposal, Building a Compelling Investment Case 
and Creating a Change Management Strategy 
 
Once a country has developed a costed and prioritized plan, the next steps are 
to work out how to finance this plan and then how to implement it effectively. 
This requires: first, a robust and realistic financing proposal to ensure 
inclusion in domestic budgets and where relevant, to attract donor support; 
second, a compelling investment case, that ensures sustained economic and 
political support for improving preparedness; and finally, a change 
management strategy that ensures the committed engagement of relevant 
stakeholders. Reinforcing preparedness is not a quick fix: it is a complex 
multi-stakeholder process that stretches well beyond the ministry of health 
and can often entail far-reaching changes in established attitudes, practices, 
and institutions. 
 
To support national governments in translating costed and prioritized plans 
into detailed financing proposals the World Bank is developing the Health 
Security Financing Assessment Tool (HSFAT), which is designed to 
complement the JEE and PVS assessment mechanism.  
 
Recommendation 4: Depending on the national budget cycle, but ideally within 
three months of developing a prioritized and costed plan following JEE and PVS 
assessments, national governments should prepare a detailed financing proposal 




A prioritized and costed plan, plus a detailed financing proposal are essential 
prerequisites for effective action to improve preparedness. Yet experience 
suggests these alone are not enough. To catalyze the commitment of resources 
to deliver the plan, its proponents in each country need broad political and 
social support. To win such support requires a compelling investment case 
that articulates the political and economic arguments for reinforcing 
preparedness in the context of each individual country. Furthermore, 
ensuring effective delivery of the plan requires an integrated change 
management strategy that engages and coordinates relevant stakeholders. 
 
Recommendation 5: Each national government should develop an investment 
case, articulating the political and economic arguments for integrating the costed 
plan into national budget cycles and committing resources to reinforce and 
sustain preparedness, plus a change management strategy to engage and 
coordinate relevant stakeholders. 
 
Identifying and Mobilizing Sustainable Financing for Preparedness 
 
Rigorous planning, a compelling investment case and convincing 
implementation strategy are indispensable, but will achieve little unless 
adequate funds can actually be identified and deployed. In many countries this 
will be achieved through giving greater priority to funding preparedness 
within existing budgets. But in other countries, it may be necessary to explore 
ways to increase fiscal space. 
 
For most countries, the optimal source of finance for preparedness is the 
domestic budget, which is the best way to ensure sustainable financing of a 
public good like preparedness and to facilitate seamless integration with 
broader efforts to strengthen the health system and extend coverage. 
However, in many low-income countries, the challenge will be inadequate 
domestic resource mobilization. Weaknesses in tax design and collection 
mean inadequate resources against a huge number of competing priorities. As 
preparedness rarely ranks high on the list of priorities, weak domestic 
resource mobilization leads to sustained underinvestment in preparedness. 
 
Yet there is considerable potential to increase tax revenues in most developing 
countries. Through sustained focus on improving tax capabilities, many low-
income countries could raise their tax ratios by 2–4 percent of GDP, with 
significant potential benefits for multiple aspects of social and economic 
development, including preparedness (IMF 2011). Most of this can be 
achieved through improving the effectiveness of the overall taxation system. 
However, earmarked taxes may also have a role to play, given the fact that 
people are often more prepared to pay taxes for health than for other 
government activities. While there is considerable debate about the longer-
term effectiveness of earmarked taxes, countries should consider their 
introduction where they might prove an effective way to generate additional 




Recommendation 6: To increase fiscal space, national governments should 
examine ways of generating incremental domestic resources to finance 
preparedness, whether by (i) improving overall tax design and collection; or (ii) 
introducing earmarked taxes where they might be an effective way to generate 
additional resources. 
 
For some lower income countries, development assistance will play an 
important role in financing better preparedness. Many advanced economies 
have made significant collective and individual commitments to providing 
development assistance for reinforcing preparedness, such as the G7 
commitment to support 76 countries or the World Bank’s to support at least 
25, and it is important that such commitments are fulfilled. Given the scale of 
the risks to mankind as a whole and the global economy, there is a strong self-
interest argument for richer countries to deploy development funds for 
investing in universal health security. To maximize the catalytic impact of such 
development assistance, development partners should prioritize three 
categories of financial support: 
 
Financing capital investments or one-off expenditures to achieve a step 
change in preparedness capacities in poorer countries. These might include 
laboratories or specialized training. Wherever possible, beneficiary countries 
should then take on the financing of ongoing recurrent expenditure. 
 
Financing regional initiatives. Regional laboratory facilities and cross-border 
disease surveillance systems should be important components of many 
smaller countries’ plans to reinforce preparedness. Yet gaining agreement 
between countries on how to finance such shared capacities may impede their 
implementation. Here development assistance can play a critical role. 
 
Financing the creation of baseline preparedness and prevention capacities in 
fragile and conflict-affected states, where domestic resourcing is an unrealistic 
aspiration and there are significant gaps in the underlying health system.  
 
In all cases, development should seek to support the financing of preparedness 
through the national health security plans and budgets emanating from the 
JEE process, and use the JEE criteria as benchmarks of achievement. 
Wherever possible development partners should seek to secure commitments 
from recipient governments around matching and ongoing funding so as to 
maximize the impact of the development assistance. 
 
Recommendation 7: Development partners should fulfill and build on existing 
collective and bilateral commitments to help finance preparedness in countries 
needing support, focusing on: (i) in-country capital investments and one-off 
spends; (ii) multi-country regional initiatives; and (iii) failed and fragile states 
where domestic resourcing is not a realistic option. To maximize the catalytic 
impact of their assistance, development partners should structure their support to 
the health security plans emanating from the JEE process and encourage national 





Engaging the Private Sector in Reinforcing and Financing 
Preparedness 
 
Private-sector companies have much to lose from disease outbreaks, but are 
often only marginally involved in the implementation of initiatives to reinforce 
preparedness and response and typically make little direct financial 
contribution to preparedness. This must change. 
 
There are a variety of possible ways to engage the private sector more 
effectively, though none is a “silver bullet.” First, it is important to build much 
greater awareness of the risks of infectious disease outbreaks amongst private 
sector leaders. In addition to stimulating companies to improve their own 
internal preparedness, such awareness-building should make business 
leaders less resistant to taxes or regulations related to reinforcing pandemic 
prevention and response and more inclined to work with governments to 
mitigate the risks. Second, governments should seek to involve the private 
sector in plans to reinforce preparedness and response, leveraging relevant 
private sector assets and capabilities. Third, where private sector companies 
contribute to the risks of infectious diseases as a result of their business 
activities, such as livestock production, governments should introduce 
regulations to require appropriate investment in risk mitigation and 
preparedness. Governments may also want consider encouraging or even 
mandating corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending on preparedness.  
 
Recommendation 8: National governments should incorporate the private sector 
into their strategy for reinforcing preparedness, through a combination of 
awareness-building, direct involvement in preparedness and response planning, 
and regulation. Where private sector companies contribute directly or indirectly 
to the risks of disease outbreak and spread by the nature of their business, 
national governments should introduce regulations requiring such companies to 
invest in risk mitigation and preparedness. 
 
Leveraging Insurance to Finance Response and Incentivize 
Preparedness 
  
As has been demonstrated in the earthquake and drought contexts, insurance 
can play an important role in ensuring rapid disbursement of funds to finance 
disaster response, and in creating incentives for investing in risk mitigation 
and preparedness. 
 
To pioneer the deployment of insurance mechanisms in the infectious disease 
arena, the World Bank, and other partners developed the Pandemic 
Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), a parametric insurance vehicle designed 
to provide rapid disbursement of emergency finance. The PEF covers a range 
of diseases and is focused on countries that are part of the International 
Development Association (IDA), with the premiums funded by donor nations. 
Through this initiative the World Bank and its partners have worked through 
numerous challenges and technical issues associated with utilizing innovative 
insurance mechanisms for pandemic response. There is an opportunity to 
build on this experience to develop a “PEF2”, and to encourage the 
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development of insurance products for the private sector. While rapid 
disbursement of funds in response is a real benefit, the greater prize from 
introducing insurance mechanisms for both governments and the private 
sector are the incentives insurance creates for investment in preparedness. 
This will require the development of much broader markets, which will 
inevitably take time.  
 
Recommendation 9: The Insurance Development Forum, the World Bank, and 
other partners should work together to: (i) develop the next iteration of the 
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF2) that specifically ties recipient 
countries’ investments in preparedness to relief of their contributions to PEF2 
premiums; (ii) deliver maximum participation from the insurance markets to 
provide capacity for PEF2; and (iii) investigate how insurance for business 
interruption resulting from disease outbreaks can be provided to private sector 
companies in target countries. 
 
Incentivizing Countries to Invest in Preparedness 
 
We will only achieve a substantial reduction in the risks to human lives and 
livelihoods across the globe from infectious disease outbreaks if individual 
countries commit to investing in national preparedness. For this to happen, 
governments need to be convinced that investing in public health systems is 
absolutely necessary despite the multitude of competing demands for scarce 
budget resources. The current under-preparedness of many countries 
indicates that this case has not been convincingly made. 
 
One approach is to ensure that plans and financing proposals for improving 
preparedness are underpinned by a more compellingly articulated investment 
case. That is the logic of Recommendation 5. 
 
Yet this alone is not enough. The most powerful way to reinforce the 
investment case and create more direct incentives for investment in 
preparedness is to ensure that the risks attaching to infectious disease 
outbreaks are reflected in financial markets and businesses’ investment 
decisions. Another complementary approach would be to use measures of 
preparedness to influence the flows of development assistance, such as 
concessional financing from the World Bank. 
 
If a country’s economic vulnerability to infectious disease outbreaks was 
incorporated in mainstream macroeconomic analyses, bond ratings and 
investment criteria, investment in pandemic preparedness would no longer be 
solely the concern of the Health Minister. Encouraging the development of 
metrics around intrinsic risk, state of preparedness and sectoral vulnerability 
would change the way such decisions are made. This could be achieved 
through official initiatives, academic efforts or private endeavors, or through 
creative partnerships (perhaps along the lines of UNDP’s partnership with 
S&P to include the Human Development Index (HDI) in devising sovereign 
ratings). Inclusion of infectious disease risks in the IMF’s Article IV 
consultations, in situations where such risks are considered macro-critical, 




Recommendation 10:  To reinforce incentives for national governments to invest 
in preparedness, the IMF and World Bank should work to facilitate the 
incorporation of the economic risks of infectious disease outbreaks into 
macroeconomic and market assessments, including: (i) inclusion into Article IV 
assessments where such risks are macro-critical; (ii) encouraging the 
development of academic and private sector indices and maps of intrinsic risk, 
preparedness and economic vulnerability. 
 
Countries are also likely to pay more attention to investing in preparedness if 
doing so increases access to concessional international finance. One way of 
achieving this is by introducing an assessment of preparedness as a criterion 
in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) tool that the World 
Bank uses to determine the country allocation of IDA resources. 
 
Introducing an assessment of pandemic preparedness would have two 
benefits. First, the fact that countries are being assessed on pandemic 
preparedness will raise its visibility, profile and importance. Second, countries 
that do well on this assessment will be able to increase their allocations of 
concessional finance through IDA.  
 
Recommendation 11: The World Bank should include assessment of pandemic 
preparedness capacity in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
tool and include the rating in the overall country score used as part of the IDA 
allocation formula. Other multilateral development banks should consider 
introducing equivalent mechanisms to incentivize investment in preparedness. 
 
In 2013, the World Bank adopted a new strategy focused on aligning the 
institutions work with the twin goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting 
shared prosperity in a sustained manner. The World Bank introduced a 
diagnostic exercise, called the Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCD), to 
identify key challenges and opportunities for a country to accelerate progress 
towards development objectives consistent with the twin goals. This 
diagnostic is a reference point for World Bank Group client consultations with 
countries. Incorporating an assessment of a country’s pandemic preparedness 
in the Bank’s SCD will emphasize the importance of preparedness and give the 
issue greater visibility in the eyes of policy makers. Further, it will help 
countries make a strong case for concessional Bank finance in support of 
investments in pandemic preparedness. 
 
Recommendation 12: The World Bank should incorporate analysis of pandemic 
preparedness in country-specific Systematic Country Diagnostics that identify a 
set of priorities through which a country may most effectively and sustainably 






For far too long, our approach to pandemics has been one of panic and neglect: 
throwing money and resources at the problem when a serious outbreak 
occurs; then neglecting to fund preparedness when the news headlines move 
on. The result has been too many lives lost, too much damage to human 
livelihoods. As recent news of a new Ebola outbreak demonstrates (May 2017), 
the threat of deadly pathogens is ever present. New outbreaks will occur, but 
by investing in prevention, detection, containment and response we can 
reduce their frequency and impact. Investing in global health security is an 
imperative. Otherwise we will all too often see poorer, more vulnerable 
countries suffering terrible loss of life and being knocked off their trajectory 
of social and economic development. And we put the world as a whole at risk 
of some highly contagious deadly influenza or other virus that could kill 
millions and wipe trillions from the global economy. 
 
Strengthening preparedness at a national level reinforces our first line of 
defense against the threat of pandemics. It is not the whole answer: we also 
need to strengthen capabilities and coordination at a global level; and we must 
accelerate research and development to give us more scientific weapons to 
fight infectious pathogens. Yet unless we can prevent, detect, contain and 
respond at a local level we will always be on the back foot.  
 
Building and maintaining preparedness requires sustained financing. The 
absolute sums are not large relative to the scale of the risk, but thus far many 
governments and development partners have failed to give preparedness the 
priority it merits. We must demonstrate the power of the investment case. We 
must secure commitments to sustained financing and monitor that these are 
delivered. Only then can we be confident that we have made the world a safer 





The Preparedness Problem 
 
In the wake of the Ebola crisis that began in West Africa in 2013, a series of 
reports have recommended strengthening and scaling up investments in 
global health security as an urgent priority. Expert assessments by the 
Harvard-London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) 
Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola (November 2015), the 
U.S. National Academy of Medicine’s (NAM) Commission on Creating a 
Global Health Risk Framework for the Future (January 2016), and the UN 
High Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises (February 2016) 
urge far-reaching improvements in nations’ public health capabilities and 
infrastructure, in international leadership for preparedness and response, and 
in research and development related to infectious diseases.  
 
Emphasizing the urgent need to invest in preparedness, the Harvard-LSHTM 
Panel called upon the global community and countries to agree on a clear 
strategy to ensure that governments invest domestically in building core 
public health and system capacities, and to mobilize adequate external 
support to supplement these efforts, especially in poorer countries. 
Highlighting infectious diseases as one of the biggest risks facing humankind, 
the NAM Commission on Creating a Global Health Risk Framework for the 
Future argued that reinforcing public health capabilities should be a top 
priority and estimates that $4.5 billion must be spent annually to prepare the 
world for the next global health crisis, whether it is a resurgence of Ebola, 
SARS, or bird flu, a swiftly moving threat like Zika, or some entirely new 
disease. Stressing the need for all countries to meet the full obligations of the 
International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR), the UN High Level Panel noted 
that building a global health architecture that is better prepared to respond to 
health crises will require additional financial resources, and stresses the need 
to mobilize domestic and international funding, especially for low-income 
countries, to support the implementation of the IHR’s Core Capacity 
requirements.  
 
The International Working Group 
 
In response to these calls for increased investment in preparedness, the 
International Working Group on Financing Preparedness (IWG) was 
established at the World Bank in November 2016. Comprising 17 experts and 
leaders from multilateral organizations, academia, philanthropic institutions, 
government, and businesses, the IWG proposes ways in which national 
governments and development partners can effectively and sustainably 
finance investments to strengthen country and regional preparedness and 
response capacities for health emergencies. These capacities include disease 
surveillance, diagnostic laboratories, field epidemiology, infection control, 
and emergency planning. They are set out in the IHR, the 11 action packages 
of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), the 19 action areas of WHO’s 
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Joint External Evaluation (JEE), and the performance of veterinary services 
as measured by the 4 areas of OIE PVS. 
 
The IWG has focused on developing the business case for increasing 
investment in preparedness and response; identifying approaches to prioritize 
investments in country-level preparedness within existing national budgets; 
suggesting options for incremental domestic resource mobilization for 
funding preparedness and response from both the public and private sectors; 
and identifying how development financing for health can be used to catalyze 
and support domestic investments in preparedness in countries requiring 
assistance. Our report sets out an overall timetable for financing this agenda 
against which countries and the international community can hold themselves 
accountable. 
 
Because the IWG is primarily concerned with the challenges of financing 
preparedness at the country level, many topics lie outside our scope. Our 
analysis does not address funding for global capabilities and coordination, 
such as the WHO itself. Nor do we discuss the financing of accelerated 
research and development for either infectious diseases or antimicrobial 
resistance. These latter issues are being addressed through initiatives such as 
the Coalition for Emergency Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). 
 
How We Worked 
 
The IWG’s work was spread over three phases: a preparatory phase, during 
which we established what data existed, took stock of work done already, and 
identified selected individuals and organizations for further cooperation; an 
analytical phase, during which we conducted data analysis, established 
patterns and relationships in the data and addressed the group’s mandate 
through the synthesis of numerical and narrative data; and a compilation of 
recommendations phase, which marked the culmination of the first two 
phases and during which members considered the various emerging options 
and settled upon the recommendations contained in this report. The IWG held 
two face-to-face full membership meetings and a series of theme-specific 
discussions over its six-month tenure. Members used these meetings to share 
ideas, examine evidence, test hypotheses and form recommendations.  
 
The recommendations of the IWG are expected to inform the implementation 
of the financing-related recommendations of the various panels, provide input 
to the Global Health Crises Task Force (established by the UN Secretary-
General to monitor implementation of recommendations of the UN High 
Level Panel), and contribute to the development of a financing framework to 
assist in the implementation following an external evaluation. The IWG’s 




This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals identified for their 
expertise, experience and perspectives. Comments and suggestions from the 
peer reviewers were received in writing and in discussions, and have been 
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addressed in the final report. The report has not been modified or amended in 
any substantive manner (other than minor editorial corrections) after the 
completion of the review process.  
 
Overview of the Report 
 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes 
the case for investing in pandemic preparedness. Chapter 3 looks at how 
countries can identify the gaps in their pandemic defenses, assess resource 
needs, and develop an action plan. Chapter 4 discusses the importance of 
preparing a robust financing proposal, compelling investment case and an 
overarching change management strategy. Chapter 5 focuses on ways in which 
countries can mobilize additional resources for preparedness, both 
domestically as well as through external assistance. Chapter 6 examines 
measures which can potentially incentivize countries to give greater 
importance to financing preparedness. The report concludes in Chapter 7, 
which also contains a list of actions that countries and development partners 





2. Setting the Context 
 
The Case for Investing in Pandemic Preparedness 
 
The health, economic and social impacts of disease outbreaks are substantial 
(Exhibit 2.1). Measured in terms of human suffering or economic disruption, 
pandemics exact huge costs. The human tragedy of rapidly spreading 
infections has scarred the new century repeatedly. The recent Zika outbreak 
in the Americas infected over a million people. It is associated with 2,971 
confirmed cases of microcephaly, a congenital syndrome in which children of 
infected mothers are born with small heads and brain damage (PAHO 2017). 
Between December 2013 and April 2016, the largest epidemic of Ebola virus 
disease to date generated more than 28,616 cases and 11,310 deaths in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone (CDC 2016). The 2009 H1N1 influenza resulted in 
over 18,000 deaths (WHO 2009). MERS has taken 690 lives so far (WHO 
2017). Early in the new millennium, SARS killed 774 among the 8,098 people 
infected (WHO 2003). 
 
 
In infectious disease outbreaks, it’s the health sector that often gets hit the 
hardest as the sick people who come to the healthcare sector infect healthcare 
workers.  The recent Ebola outbreak claimed the lives of 518 medical staff out 
of a total of 898 infected (The Economist 2016). Sierra Leone lost 221 
healthcare workers, followed by Liberia (192) and Guinea (100). The effect is 
doubly pronounced when the health sector itself is weak. Sierra Leone, for 
example, spends under $300 per person per year on health at purchasing 
power parity, one-tenth of most countries in Europe. Guinea has 10 doctors 
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per 100,000 people, one-twentieth of most countries in Europe. One of the 
key failures in Ebola was that people did not want to seek formal care because 
the system itself was bad – so they stayed at home and got others in their 
family sick. By the time they went to a doctor, they were already very ill, and 
did not survive long. The health system therefore needs investments in 
capacity to care for sick people during outbreaks.  
 
Investments in pandemic preparedness have huge co-benefits for the 
healthcare sector. Investments in surveillance and diagnostic capacities, for 
instance, can be used for routine care of patients. This synergistic relationship 
between investing in pandemic preparedness and investing in health systems 
reinforces the argument for committing resources to strengthening public 
health capabilities, which otherwise tend to get overlooked in favor of 
investments that yield a more immediate and visible return. 
 
A Threat to Economies 
 
The high death count and social disruption are not the only costs associated 
with pandemics; the financial and economic damages are also devastating. 
Ebola wiped out many of the recent development gains in Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone, which had been among the fastest growing economies in the 
world prior to the crisis. The disease slashed investment and caused a 
substantial loss in private-sector growth; unleashed threats to food security 
through declining agricultural production; and burdened cross-border trade 
with restrictions on movement, goods, and services. The World Bank 
estimates that as a result the three countries lost $2.2 billion in GDP in 2015 
alone (World Bank 2015). 
 
Several other estimates of the projected economic impact of infectious disease 
crises bolster the case for global action on preparedness. A National Academy 
of Medicine report from 2016 uses estimated probabilities of a mild, 
moderate, and severe pandemic, and their expected economic costs, to 
produce an annualized loss estimate of $60 billion. Fan, Jamison and 
Summers (2016) offer a somewhat higher estimate of expected annual income 
loss ($80 billion). Incorporating the expected costs associated with mortality, 
which are not included in the National Academy of Medicine estimates, the 
expected annual loses rise six-fold to $490 billion.  
 
While experts have differed in their precise estimates of the cost of pandemics, 
all the figures are alarmingly high. Even the most conservative estimates (0.1 
to 1.0 percent of global GDP) suggest pandemic risks are on par with other 
high-profile economic threats that concern business leaders and policy 
makers, such as climate change (0.2 to 2.0 percent of global GDP, according 
to IPCC 2014) and natural disasters (0.3 to 0.5 percent of global GDP and 
65,000 deaths per year, according to UNISDR 2015). Precisely because they 
are so high, the estimated economic losses from infectious threats underline 







A Spiral of Fear 
 
The economic impact of disease outbreaks is exacerbated by fear, which makes 
people modify their behavior to reduce their chance of exposure. The 2015 
South Korean MERS outbreak that saw more than 16,000 people quarantined 
and claimed 38 lives is a case in point. It caused widespread panic and resulted 
in a substantial change in consumer behavior, with people avoiding 
restaurants and shopping centers and instead meeting their purchasing needs 
through online shopping. The entertainment and leisure sectors were the 
worst hit. According to data from the Korean Film Council, cinema visits 
dropped by 52 percent year on year in the first two weeks of June. Tourist 
arrivals fell by 41 percent as many visitors cancelled their plans to visit South 
Korea. In June 2015, the consumer sentiment index compiled by the Bank of 
Korea fell below the neutral 100 mark, signifying a deteriorating outlook, for 
the first time since 2012. Fears that the MERS outbreak would have a 
dramatically negative impact on private consumption led the Bank of Korea to 
cut its benchmark policy rate by 25 basis points in June (Economic 
Intelligence Unit 2015).  
 
Likewise, China, though it was slow to respond at the early stages of the 
outbreak, did everything it could in 2003 to minimize human-to-human 
contact as it tried to check the spread of SARS. Despite these efforts, the World 
Bank estimates that China’s GDP contracted by 0.5 percent in 2003 (World 
Bank 2008), while global GDP fell by $40 billion (Lee and McKibbin 2004). 
Recent economic work suggests that the annual global cost of moderately 
severe to severe pandemics is roughly $570 billion, or 0.7 percent of global 
income (Fan 2015). The cost of a severe pandemic like the 1918 influenza 
pandemic could total as much as 5 percent of global GDP (World Bank 2015). 
 
Increasing Frequency of Disease Outbreaks 
 
For many reasons, the frequency and diversity of disease outbreaks have 
increased steadily since 1980. First, recent advances in travel, trade and 
connectivity have led to rapid increases in speed and volume not only of 
humans, animals and commodities, but also of deadly pathogens. Second, 
there has been unprecedented increase in unplanned urbanization, because of 
which millions of people live in crowded spaces and unhygienic conditions, 
which can be perfect breeding grounds for diseases to spread. Third, civil 
unrest and war displace large volumes of people, who move to new places, 
carrying with them a variety of infectious disease organisms. And fourth, 
global warming is creating new belts of warm and moist environments, which 
are ideal conditions for the spread of disease vectors.  
 
Between 1980 and 2013, 12,012 outbreaks of 215 human infectious diseases 
have been recorded, comprising more than 44 million cases occurring in 219 
nations. In an analysis of this dataset, Smith et al (2014) finds that after 
controlling for disease surveillance, communications, geography and host 
availability, it is found that the total number and richness (i.e., number of 





Exhibit 2.2 plots these outbreaks. Panel (a) depicts the rising trend in total 
outbreaks and richness of causal diseases over time. Panel (b) presents the 
same information, but according to host type. Panel (c) shows the pathogen 
taxonomy, while panel (d) graphs the transmission modes. 
 
 
Source: Smith et al 2014 
 
Deadly and Unpredictable: The Example of Influenza 
 
The unpredictability of the occurrence of pandemics makes the case for 
investing in preparedness even more compelling. Influenza pandemics, which 
kill many people, show no predictable periodicity or pattern – beyond that 
they seem to occur roughly every 3 or 4 decades (Exhibit 2.3). There is a high 
probability that the world will experience a severe outbreak in the next 10 to 
30 years that could destabilize societies and economies; but it’s anyone’s guess 
when and where it might emerge.  
 
Fifty million people are believed to have died in the 1918 influenza pandemic, 
which infected a third of the world’s population. This was in an age before 
intercontinental air travel and globalization, and at a time when the world’s 
population was under 2 billion. Two other worldwide influenza outbreaks 
occurred in the last century, in 1957 (H2N2 Asian flu) and 1968 (H3N2 Hong 
Kong flu), with death tolls in the 1-3 million range.1 These pandemics 
represented 3 different antigenic subtypes of influenza A virus (H1N1, H2N2, 
                                                        
1 Not classified as “true” pandemics are 3 notable epidemics: the 1947 H1N1 pseudo-pandemic in Japan 
and Korea, which recorded low death rates; the 1976 H1N1 epidemic of swine influenza in New Jersey, 
USA, which caused serially transmitted disease, pneumonia, and death at a military installation, but 
disappeared within a few weeks; and the 1977 H1N1 Russian flu, which was almost entirely restricted to 






and H3N2 respectively), and differed from each other with respect to etiologic 




The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the first of the 21st century, showed how 
a new virus could spread very quickly to every corner of the globe in an era 
where the concentrations of human populations and their constant global 
movements prevent the local extinction of the virus population.3 The first 
cases of the novel swine-derived H1N1 influenza A virus were detected in 
Mexico and the United States in late April 2009, and by the end of the year the 
virus had spread to 208 countries, resulting in hundreds of thousands of cases 
and at least 18,000 deaths.  
 
                                                        
2 Not much is known about the antecedents of the virus of 1918 flu, but in the case of 1957 and 1968 
pandemics, both of which occurred in the era of modern virology, the hemagglutinin antigen of the 
causative viruses showed major changes from the corresponding antigens of immediately antecedent 
strains. This renders prediction difficult, especially since “with 16 known forms of influenza hemagglutinin 
(the “H” in the strain name), 9 known varieties of neuraminidase enzyme (the “N” in the name), and 
different subtypes within each type, the potential for new enzymatic combinations—and recombinations—
is great.” Harmon K. 2011  
3 This is also why today’s pandemic risk prediction models have begun to introduce the concept of 
“effective distance” rather than actual distance to understand how infections are likely to spread. See 






If a pandemic virus equivalent in pathogenicity to the virus of 1918 were to 
return in the highly inter-connected, globalized, and urbanized 21st century 
world, it would likely kill more than a 100 million people, even with today’s 
vastly advanced antiviral and antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and prevention 
knowledge (Taubenberger and Morens 2006). 
Speaking at a conference on international security policy in Munich in 2017, 
Bill Gates ranked pandemics (including the growing potential for intentional 
or accidental release of a synthetic or modified agent) alongside climate 
change and nuclear war as the three biggest threats facing the world (Munich 
Security Conference 2017). Yet, pandemics have not caught the imagination of 
world leaders in quite the same way as climate change and nuclear wars. 
Pandemics attract a lot of attention when they are at their height; but once the 
worst is over, the sense of urgency disappears, both at the global and country 
level, and we start all over again.4 At the opening session of the Skoll World 
Forum in Oxford, U.K., World Bank Group President Jim Kim said that “what 
happens every time” in the face of pandemics is a cycle of “panic, neglect, 
panic, neglect” (Devex 2015).  
 
The Challenge of Financing Preparedness  
 
The huge social, health, and economic devastation wrought by Zika and Ebola 
has put the challenge of strengthening outbreak preparedness and 
responsiveness of countries on the agenda at the highest political level. But 
this is not the first time that the world’s attention has been drawn to the need 
to be better prepared; earlier viral outbreaks such as SARs and H1N1 had also 
led to similar calls. And yet, countries chronically underinvest in preparedness 
planning, disease and risk monitoring, and primary care. Health sector 
development strategies commonly lack focus, and public finance management 
lacks means to target resources. Complex political economies undermine 
strategic priority setting, and development assistance largely remains targeted 
to specific diseases. External assistance prompts governments to shift budgets 
away from health, and the financing of health often falls short of any 
internationally agreed target, such as the Abuja pledge of allocating at least 15 
percent of annual budgets to improve the health sector (WHO 2011). 
 
What Does It Take to Be Prepared? 
 
Long before the recent Zika and Ebola outbreaks, global initiatives had 
established a comprehensive set of guidelines, tools, and technical assistance 
to help countries improve their preparedness and response capacity. The IHR, 
promulgated in 1969 under the auspices of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), were broadened in 2005 to guide countries in detecting, assessing, 
reporting, and responding to all events that could potentially constitute public 
health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC).  
                                                        
4 The story of Zika carries a potentially threatening message. As the world scrambled to find ways to 
counter transmission and understand the virus’ impact of fetal brain development, it is difficult to avoid 
the thought that earlier recognition of the surge in microcephaly cases and the link to Zika infection would 
have been immensely valuable. When countering infectious disease outbreaks, days and weeks matter, and 




All WHO member states are required to have or to develop minimum core 
public health capacities to implement the IHR effectively (WHO 2016). 
Progress in building the needed capacities has been slow, however, and in 
2014 only one-third of the countries in the world reported having the ability 
to assess, detect and respond to public health emergencies (CDC 2016). 
Countries in Africa scored the lowest across most preparedness indicators, 
and only about two-thirds reported developing multi-hazard national public 
health emergency preparedness and response plans.  
 
WHO has also updated its global influenza preparedness plan, which outlines 
components that countries should include in their national preparedness 
plans with a focus on core public health components, including surveillance, 
reporting, communication, and case management. Subsequent guidance 
expanded preparedness to include other sectors, such as education and 
interior, in a “one country” approach (WHO 2007).  
 
More recently, about 55 countries promoted GHSA. This agenda covers 11 
technical targets, including activities related to the prevention of outbreaks, 
promotion of key practices, and actions to improve countries’ response 
capacity. Recent years have also seen a resurgence in the concept of health 
systems strengthening, with a particular emphasis on increasing systems’ 
“resilience” (Kruk et al. 2015). The prescription for health systems resilience 
emphasizes the spectrum of essential inputs, including: health workers, 
infrastructure, supply chains, health information, surveillance, infection 
prevention and control, and community mobilization.  
 
Why Is This So Hard?  
 
With growing international attention focused on the problem, why have many 
countries still struggled to achieve preparedness against infectious threats? 
Part of the answer is obvious. The requirements for preparedness are 
complicated (Exhibit 2.4). At a minimum, countries need a solid legal and 
regulatory foundation, adequately trained and equipped public health 
workforce, strong surveillance and response framework, functional national 
public health laboratories, and robust multi-sectoral coordination. Many of 
these components lie in different parts of government and are often financed 
through a variety of different mechanisms, ranging from emergency 
allocations, routine sectoral provisions and ad-hoc apportionments. Faced 
with this complexity, it is not surprising that many countries have struggled 
even to draft a national plan of action with specific activities, timelines, and 
budgets. Rational and increased financing will require establishing a common 
vocabulary, together with a common framework for defining priorities and 
core investments for preparedness. This is also important to avoid a “flavor of 
the month” approach whereby financing partners use the word preparedness 






Preparedness and Systems Performance 
 
The challenge of financing preparedness is not limited to ensuring a sufficient 
level of resources. In many instances, there has been insufficient 
consideration of the way different system sub-components need to be 
combined to achieve satisfactory performance in the context of uncertainty 
and emergencies.  
 
To grasp this more clearly, it is helpful to recall what we mean by 
“preparedness.” Preparedness for pandemics refers to a range of health and 
non-health interventions, capabilities, and capacities at community, country, 
regional, and global levels. Their purpose is to prevent, detect, and respond to 
the spread of disease and other hazards, mitigating social disruptions and 
limiting risks to international travel and trade.  
 
Three aspects of investing in pandemic preparedness deserve special mention. 
First, preparedness is part of a broader approach to disaster risk management. 
Resources put into preparedness are investments in critical risk management 
for countries, regions, and the global community as a whole. Second, 
preparedness is a core component of health systems strengthening, both 
depending on and contributing to other parts of the health system. This means 
the costs of achieving preparedness depend on what other systems 
components exist and how well they work. This is also why preparedness 
measures cannot be undertaken for a single pathogen: “preparedness” reflects 
the performance of the full system. Third, pandemic preparedness is 
inherently multi-sectoral, requiring cooperation across different arms of 
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government and with the private sector. While experts have acknowledged 
these points, the persistence of narrow and fragmented approaches to 
financing preparedness has constrained efforts to build more resilient health 
systems.5  
 
Clarifying these concepts matters, because smart, timely, well-directed 
investments in preparedness can make a life-or-death difference for people. 
The ability of the health system to mount an effective response to Ebola virus 
outbreaks in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda highlight 
the importance of critical components of preparedness and response even in 
the context of overall weakness. The experience of Vietnam illustrates what 
can be achieved when ambition goes beyond strengthening just a few 
components. Vietnam has implemented a comprehensive One Health 
program drawing together the financing of agricultural, public health, health 
care, and public education programs. 
 
Universal Health Coverage and Security 
 
Much of modern health development policy has been marked by recurrent 
tensions between disease-specific programs (for example, addressing 
smallpox, malaria, or HIV/AIDS) and efforts to secure comprehensive 
improvements in health systems. Disease-specific programs can achieve 
remarkable gains, sometimes with dramatic speed, but may fail to build 
broader capacities. Systems-building efforts may initially yield scant 
measurable results. The tensions among different approaches, and the 
concern to swiftly remedy perceived inadequacies, have sometimes led to 
abrupt shifts in the global health vocabulary, with consequences for 
investment flows. Thus, in a matter of two decades, resource-constrained 
governments, policy experts, and political commentators alike have welcomed 
and adopted the refrains of health system strengthening (HSS), universal 
health coverage (UHC), resilient health systems, and global health security 
(GHS) – perhaps not always fully understanding what these terms mean or 
believing them to be different ways of saying the same thing. This can matter 
because although these agendas all point in broadly the same direction, the 
different nuances lead to different priorities and the sheer profusion of terms 
can cause confusion. 
 
Consider, for instance, the notion of health system strengthening, which refers 
to the holistic approach of supply-side interventions directed at the core 
functions of a health system, including financing, production, delivery, 
governance and management. It involves “putting together the right chain of 
events – financing, regulatory framework for private-public collaboration, 
governance, insurance, logistics, provider payment and incentive 
mechanisms, information, well-trained personnel, basic infrastructure, and 
supplies – to ensure equitable access to effective health interventions and a 
continuum of care to save and improve people’s lives” (World Bank 2007). 
Distinct from specific disease-control technologies, this approach to 
developing the health sector gained popularity in the last couple of decades. It 
                                                        




offered a constructive approach to multiple problems: the shifting burden of 
disease, growing duplication in disease-specific investments, and increasing 
system-wide bottlenecks that threatened the success and sustainability of 
disease-specific programs. It is important to note, however, that health system 
strengthening is not a result in itself; rather, it comprises the instruments by 
which the health sector policy objectives are realized (Kutzin and Sparkes 
2016).  
 
These health sector policy objectives are captured in the goals of UHC, health 
security, and health resilience. The quest for UHC is a demand for both better 
health and greater equity in health. UHC is only attained when everybody has 
access to affordable, quality health services, and no one is forced into poverty 
to pay for the health care they need (Kutzin and Sparkes 2016). Health security 
can be seen as a component of UHC, since protection against health risks is a 
key part of health coverage (Anand 2011). Health system resilience is the 
ability of a health system to absorb shocks, respond with the provision of 
needed services, and sustain gains (Kruk et al 2015).  
 
WHO defines UHC as access to a broad range of services, which would include 
the services that contribute to preparedness. From this perspective, 
preparedness is the output indicator, and is a subset of UHC (Exhibit 2.5). The 
WHO framework clearly delineates that health systems (inputs) contribute to 
preparedness (specific output) which is a subset of UHC (broad output). UHC 
including preparedness then contributes to health security (impact). 
 
Some worry that a narrow focus on UHC leads to the prioritization of 
investments in curative healthcare services at the expense of strengthening 
public health competencies. In theory, attainment of UHC requires 
strengthening all aspects of the health system – including those that produce, 
finance and deliver health promotion, disease prevention, treatment, 
rehabilitation, and palliation – so that all people who need health services 
receive them, without undue financial hardship (Boerma et al 2014). In 
practice, however, public health interventions can take a back seat. Schmidt et 
al (2015) identify several pressures that can lead to the prioritization of the 
curative clinical services at the expense of population-level health 
interventions in pursuit of UHC goals. While the concept of UHC certainly 
incorporates public health services there is real possibility that public health 
interventions are under-prioritized in resource-constrained countries 






Universal Health Security  
 
At its simplest, health security refers to the protection from threats to health 
(Heymann 2015), and entails the intrinsic value of protection against risk 
(Anand 2011). Ensuring health security for all by strengthening health and 
related systems to protect all citizens from threats to health is an objective that 
seems entirely consistent with UHC, although universal health security 
perhaps goes further than the most narrow interpretations of the UHC goal. 
Universal health security includes reducing the vulnerability of populations to 
health threats that spread within and across national borders and from 
inadvertent or malicious actions as well as natural causes. Moreover, universal 
health security both depends on and contributes to health systems 
strengthening and health systems resilience. 
 
No terminology is perfect. For example, in some countries, “security” is a 
loaded and equivocal term. Yet even acknowledging these limitations, 
universal health security remains a useful framing concept, not least because 
it clearly connects the health agenda to both human security and economic 
security, enabling health security to be thought of in the same light as other 
major risks that governments should manage. 
 
Similarly, the concept of health security connects health action to the broader 
development agenda. As Ebola demonstrated, pandemics can completely 
knock countries off their development trajectory, undermining hard won 
achievements, not just in health but across multiple dimensions of human and 
economic development. Seen in this light, universal health security is a way of 




Integrated Action to Reach the Goal 
  
In the remainder of this report, we set out 12 specific recommendations to 
ensure adequate and sustained financing of preparedness. There is a risk that 
countries and development partners may only accept some of these 
recommendations or may implement them only partially. However, the 
recommendations are integrated and interdependent. Together they 
constitute a unified framework for sustainable financing of preparedness. To 
be effective in achieving universal health security, we need to pursue them all. 
For this reason, we call on the global community to implement the framework 
in its entirety. We address this call to national governments, international and 
regional bodies, and all development partners. In protecting humankind 
against infectious disease crises, global preparedness is only as strong as its 
weakest link. 
 
Recommendation 1: National governments and development partners should 
commit to a path towards universal health security by adopting and implementing 
the framework set out in this report and embodied in Recommendations 2-12. 
 
This chapter has summarized the case for investment in pandemic 
preparedness. If countries and partners are convinced by the arguments, what 
should they do next? Chapter 3 looks at how countries can identify the gaps in 
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3. Identifying Gaps and Estimating Funding Needs 
 
International Cooperation on Infectious Threats:  
Historical Background 
 
The first International Sanitary Conference took place in Paris in 1851 in 
response to a cholera epidemic that ravaged Europe for nearly 15 years. A 
hundred years later, in 1951, member states of the newly-constituted WHO 
adopted the International Sanitary Regulations, which were replaced by and 
renamed the International Health Regulations in 1969. Narrowly focused on 
six serious infectious diseases (cholera, plague, yellow fever, smallpox, 
relapsing fever, and typhus), IHR (1969) depended on official country 
notification of disease outbreaks and did not establish a formal internationally 
coordinated mechanism to contain disease spread or ensure country 
commitment to standards. Further, some countries were reluctant to report 
diseases for fear of trade and travel restrictions (WHO 2009). The resurgence 
of cholera, plague, and Ebola in the 1990s exposed the limitations of IHR 
(1969), which led to calls for their revision in 1995, and a call to WHO in 2001 
to support countries in strengthening their capacity to detect and respond 
rapidly to communicable disease threats (WHO 2009).  
 
All this while, the IHR remained largely unchanged. Negligence persisted 
among countries, and the capacities of most countries to detect and respond 
to disease outbreaks remained low. This inertia was shaken by SARS, which 
made its first appearance in November 2002 in China's Guangdong province 
(Huang 2004). The disease spread rapidly around the globe. Concerns raised 
by SARS intensified the IHR revision process, and by 2005, the scope of the 
regulations was broadened to cover all public health threats, including 
existing, new, and emerging threats and those caused by non-infectious 
disease agents. The revised IHR (2005) required countries to report all 
possible hazards with the potential to be public health emergencies of 
international concern, regardless of cause, and provide this information in a 
timely manner.  
 
Another important change introduced in IHR (2005) required all countries to 
develop, strengthen, and maintain core capacities for surveillance and 
response (Katz and Fischer 2010). These revisions came into force in 2007 
and are binding for all WHO member states. However, they did not include an 
enforcement mechanism for states that fail to comply. Peer pressure and fear 
of tarnished international image were deemed to be sufficient motivators for 
countries to invest in strengthening their core public health competencies.  
 
IHR (2005) enjoyed only a couple of years of respite before the world was 
shaken by another public health threat. In 2009, H1N1 triggered the IHR 
mechanisms. While the response was largely successful, shortcomings of the 
IHR (2005) also became apparent (Katz and Fischer 2010). The gaps and 
limited capacities in their public health systems meant that countries could 
not keep up with the public health, trade, and travel recommendations of the 
IHR. This not only exposed vulnerabilities in states whose domestic capacities 
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were limited, but increased risks for their regional and global peers. What 
became clear is that, even though all WHO member states had agreed to IHR 
(2005), only a few had developed the mechanisms needed to meet their 
obligations.  
 
Strengthening IHR Implementation: Slow Going  
 
After the entry into force of the IHR (2005) in 2007, the 61st World Health 
Assembly (WHA) adopted a resolution whereby countries and WHO are 
required to report to the WHA on IHR implementation progress. The WHO 
secretariat subsequently published the IHR Core Capacity Monitoring 
Framework in 2010, accompanied by an IHR Monitoring Tool (WHO 2011). 
The Monitoring Tool identifies 13 core capacities for preparedness, detection, 
and response. These capacities are essential national public health functions 
which provide health protection for domestic populations and collectively also 
provide the basis for global health security.  
 
Through the IHR Monitoring Tool, WHO asked countries to conduct annual 
self-assessments on IHR implementation, focusing on the 13 core capacities. 
Countries were requested to issue formal reports in 2012 (with additional 
reports in 2014 and 2016 for governments that requested extensions) to 
declare if they had fully implemented the regulations. However, most 
countries have yet to fully establish these core capacities. In 2014, only 64 
countries reported meeting core capacities, while 48 failed even to respond to 
the WHO request (Gostin and Katz 2016). Despite extensions reaching into 
2016, the situation had not changed much.  
 
Even if all countries had reported accurately and in a timely manner, national 
self-assessments have been shown to provide unreliable estimates of 
countries’ true capability. In addition, governments have not used a consistent 
set of evidence-based metrics to measure compliance. These deficiencies 
undermine the integrity and utility of self-assessments.  
 
Every WHO IHR Review Committee and all major post-Ebola commissions 
have demanded that States Parties build and strengthen core capacities. 
Despite this, governments have not properly funded and implemented the 
required capacities, and international assistance has been limited (WHO 
2016). Achieving IHR core capacities remains an indisputable baseline for 
global health security; the longer it takes to detect an event, the slower the 




Due to the recognized limitations of self-assessment-based reporting, calls for 
external assessment of capabilities have been raised several times, both by the 
WHO and other actors. In 2014, the United States, in conjunction with 
partners from around the world, launched the GHSA, which developed eleven 
specific targets to accelerate IHR and PVS implementation and piloted a 
health security external assessment tool and process. In early 2014, just as the 
GHSA partnership was launched, an Ebola epidemic began to spread in West 
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Africa, eventually triggering the declaration of a PHEIC by the WHO and the 
rapid rallying of international response measures. The explosive proliferation 
of Ebola made very clear how insufficiently many countries were prepared for 
such events; none of the West African nations were in compliance with IHR. 
 
After recommendations and approval from the Executive Board at its 136th 
session and the 68th World Health Assembly, the WHO Secretariat proceeded 
to develop a blended evaluation approach that combined self-evaluation, peer 
review, and voluntary external evaluations, involving a mix of domestic and 
independent experts (WHO 2015). A task force was also established to ensure 
that this tool was harmonized with existing assessment tools for IHR 
implementation.  
 
This process resulted in the Joint External Evaluation, which built on and 
included the original GHSA targets. In naming the process, “Joint” was 
intended to refer to an assessment combining self-assessment by a multi-
sectoral team of national experts, followed by an in-country review by a second 
team of similarly multi-sectoral international peer experts, i.e., the “External 
Evaluation” (WHO 2016). The WHO Global Policy Group subsequently 
endorsed the JEE tool as the single standard WHO instrument to be used for 
externally assessing member states’ IHR capacities. Countries are expected to 
go through a JEE once every 5 years. 
 
National animal health sectors also undergo internal and external 
assessments, facilitated by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). 
OIE has developed a well-established external standard evaluation called the 
OIE PVS Pathway, which assesses the quality of national veterinary services 
and animal health systems by identifying gaps and weaknesses in compliance 
with OIE international standards (OIE 2017). The PVS tool then supports and 
promotes the establishment of priorities and strategies to help countries meet 
performance and compliance standards in a timely manner. Countries have a 
strong economic incentive to participate in the PVS process, since it expands 
their opportunities to engage in international trade in agricultural products. 
 
Using JEE and PVS to Map Preparedness Gaps  
 
JEE and PVS tools thus comprise the starting points for identifying gaps in 
preparedness and estimating funding needs. As of April 21, 2017, 37 and 131 
countries have completed JEE and PVS assessments, respectively (Table 3.1). 
Fourteen low-income countries have completed both JEE and PVS, while 25 
have undergone a PVS assessment only. Among Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
States (World Bank 2017), 7 have completed both JEE and PVS, 18 have 
completed only PVS and 1 country has completed only JEE.6 A further 32 
countries have scheduled JEE missions in the next eighteen months, and an 
                                                        
6 The PVS assessment is more than 5 years old in 78 (out of 131) countries, which would need to refresh 






additional 28 countries have expressed interest but not yet scheduled a 
mission. Out of 199 countries, 64 countries currently remain with neither a 
completed JEE nor a completed PVS (IHR-MEF 2017).7  Tables A3.1-3.3 
(placed in the annex to this chapter) list all the countries. 
 











Low-income countries (IDA), 
excluding fragile and conflict 
affected states 
14 0 25 8 
Fragile and conflict affected 
states 
7 1 18 8 
Middle and high income 
countries 
12 3 55 48 
TOTAL 33 4 98 64 
 
Recommendation 2: (i) By the end of 2017, all national governments should 
commit to participate in, and by the end of 2019, conduct a Joint External  
Evaluation (JEE) to assess their capacity to comply with the requirements of the 
International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR) to prevent, detect, and rapidly 
respond to public health threats; (ii) By the end of 2017, all national governments 
should commit to participate in, and by the end of 2019, conduct an evaluation of 
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) to assess their capacity to comply with 
the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) standards. 
 
Designing a National Action Plan  
 
Following the identification of a baseline and gaps through JEE/PVS and 
other relevant assessments, the next step is for countries to develop a plan 
prioritizing implementation activities. To support countries in this endeavor, 
the Guidelines for Development of a National Action Plan for Health Security 
(NAPHS, WHO 2017) explain the principles of planning, costing, financing, 
and implementing preparedness plans, as well as key considerations to 
maintain throughout the process.  
 
Each national action plan will be specific to the country; however, a few 
guiding principles for effective planning can be provided (see Appendix A). 
 
 
                                                        
7 In addition, 6 countries (Georgia, Peru, Portugal, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom) were assessed 






The NAPHS process includes several dimensions, beginning with situation 
analysis and strategic planning and prioritization exercises that establish 
short-, medium-, and long-term goals based on the gap analysis (Exhibit 3.1). 
Strategic planning follows the structure of the main gaps identified through 
the JEE assessment, and a template for planning is provided to countries and 
partners supporting the planning process to help them identify and prioritize 
actions to fill major capacity gaps. The guidelines promote the development of 
a monitoring and evaluation framework, which reinforces accountability and 
multi-sectoral engagement, and resource planning. Resource planning aims 
not just to determine how much activities cost, but also to identify domestic 
and international financing opportunities.  
 
Costing, referring specifically to the process of identifying resources required 
to undertake preparedness activities and assigning them a monetary value, 
provides insights on where a country has insufficient funds or a duplication of 
funds for activities that strengthen health security. Since the action plan is 
multi-year, the costing exercise reflects the same thinking, projecting costs 
across the following five years of expected implementation. The exercise 
attempts to distinguish between capital and recurrent costs, and assists 
stakeholders in deciding what types of funding vehicles are relevant, 









Box 3.1 The Post-JEE Planning Process in Tanzania 
 
“This year, Tanzania made history by being the first country in the WHO African region and 
globally to develop a costed National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS). The journey has 
not been easy, because it has taken over a year after the country completed the JEE in February 
2016. The processes of developing of the NAPHS began in June 2016, three months after the 
JEE was completed. The NAPHS development process was started by the country’s IHR 
technical working group. While the focus was mainly on the JEE key findings and priority actions, 
other previous assessments included the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) 
Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment, the Integrated Risk Profiling Assessment, 
the Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) situation analysis, the integrated disease surveillance and 
response (IDSR) review, and the vulnerability, risk assessment and mapping (VRAM) to mention 
a few. 
 
“During the costing workshop, there was an important discussion about the need for a 
coordination platform, preferably at the Prime Minister’s Office and the creation of an inter-
ministerial committee was proposed to ensure a seamless interplay between multiple sectors and 
other existing plans at all administrative levels of the country. 
 
“The Tanzania JEE has really galvanized multiple stakeholders to work together on health 
security in the country. Importantly, even at the regional and global level, the JEE and 
subsequently the planning and costing workshops brought together several agencies including: 
WHO (all three levels), the US CDC, Finland, the US Department of Defense, FAO, OIE, JICA, 
GIZ, PHE, the US Department of Agriculture, the World Bank, national governments for cross 
fertilization. In terms of forging partnerships, it is not an overstatement to say that the Tanzania 
JEE and NAPHS development process have created and continue to create partnerships in ways 
not seen before. Now that the plan is costed, the focus turns to its implementation. Prior to 
implementation, and the country is planning high-level launch of the plan at the Parliamentary 
session in June 2017. The aim is to create public awareness including ensuring that 







As of April 21, 2017, three countries – Tanzania, Pakistan and Eritrea – have 
completed the costing exercise as part of the post-JEE preparedness planning. 
An example of the costing exercise for the four core capacities of health 
security in Tanzania is provided in Table A3.4 (placed in the annex to this 
chapter). Sixteen other countries have scheduled the post-JEE planning 






A further 31 countries – Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and CARICOM8– have also 
developed national plans, but they are not costed.9 Originally drafted with 
GHSA targets before the JEE was completed, these plans are currently being 
converted to be in line with the JEE framework.  
 
This will still leave many countries with a completed evaluation but no 
announced effort to go through the critical next steps of planning, 
prioritization, costing, and implementation. Several elements contribute to 
the current limited prioritization of preparedness in many countries. The 
process outlined above should ideally apply to all countries. However, fragile 
states (e.g., those experiencing conflict) need a tailored approach, since they 
are likely to be at high risk of infectious disease outbreaks. However, primary 
and secondary health care services in these countries are generally disrupted, 
and building long-term national preparedness capacity is not a realistic aim. 
The focus must be on urgent needs. These include basic preparedness 
functions for prevention, detection, and response, such as ad hoc 
immunization campaigns, surveillance, and the creation of emergency 
                                                        
8 CARICOM – or the Caribbean Community – is an organization of 15 Caribbean nations and 
dependencies whose main objective is to promote economic integration and cooperation among its 
members, to ensure that the benefits of integration are equitably shared, and to coordinate foreign policy. 
9 Seventeen of these countries were assisted by the United States Government, which provided $1 billion 
in support for the design and implementation of these plans. 
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operations centers. These resources may be supplied by health partners within 
the scope of their humanitarian support.  
 
The JEE framework includes AMR as one of the 19 dimensions for evaluation 
of a country’s core capacities. For AMR, the JEE assessment includes all 
activities that present integration opportunities with infectious disease 
preparedness and most of the specific aspects that are particularly relevant for 
the countries (health acquired infections, stewardship activities, etc.). 
However, the creation of national action plans for health security and for AMR 
is currently happening in most cases through different processes. Given the 
substantial overlap of activities across infectious disease outbreaks and AMR 
(see Appendix B), and with the aim to simplify processes and have an 
integrated approach to country resilience, countries could benefit from a more 
integrated approach to preparedness and AMR at the national level. While the 
two topics are already mostly integrated in one of the diagnostic tools – the 
JEE framework – this would mean having also a joint costing, budgeting and 
funding process. 
 
Recommendation 3: Within nine months of completion of JEE and PVS, national 
governments should develop and publish a prioritized and costed plan to 
implement recommendations emerging from the JEE and PVS assessments, 
including regional elements where relevant. 
 
The JEE and NAPHS offer robust frameworks for country diagnostic and 
planning processes. However, to ensure that countries will be able to 
successfully implement their planned actions and fill existing gaps in their 
capacities for preparedness, two additional catalytic elements need to be in 
place: 
 A financing proposal, needed to mobilize sustainable funding over time 
 
 A high level of buy-in and commitment – driven by the formulation of a 
compelling political-economic case for preparedness  
 
These additional ingredients clearly sound desirable in theory. But how can 
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Annex to Chapter 3 
 
Table A3.1 JEE/PVS Completion Status (low-income countries, 
excluding fragile states) 
Both PVS and JEE 
Only JEE (no 
PVS) 
Only PVS (no 
JEE) 
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Table A3.2 JEE/PVS Completion Status (fragile states) 




























Papua New Guinea 



















Table A3.3 JEE/PVS Completion Status (middle and high income countries) 











































































































































Table A3.4 Preparedness Costing Exercise, Tanzania, FY 2017 (US$ ‘000) 
  2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 TOTAL 
Prevent 5,834 11,946 12,335 9,338 8,901 48,355 
Detect 8,628 13,134 15,481 12,870 8,162 58,274 
Preparedness 1,467 2,970 606 735 788 6,566 
Other IHR-Related 
Hazards, Points of Entry 
2,454 5,556 5,752 3,378 3,278 20,419 
Cross-Cutting  154 154   308 





4. Preparing a Financing Proposal, a Compelling 
Investment Case and a Change Management 
Strategy 
 
Once a country has developed a costed and prioritized plan, the next steps are 
to work out how to finance this plan and then how to implement it effectively. 
This requires three key components: first, a realistic financing proposal to 
ensure inclusion in domestic budgets and, where relevant, win the support of 
development partners; second, a compelling investment case that ensure 
sustained economic and political support for improving preparedness; and 
finally, a change management strategy that facilitates the committed 
engagement of relevant stakeholders.  
 
All three components are essential. A financing proposal without an 
investment case will get no traction. Even a well-financed plan without a 
change management strategy will likely fail to deliver. Reinforcing 
preparedness is not a quick fix: it is a complex, multi-stakeholder process that 
needs to stretch well beyond health ministries and can often entail far reaching 
changes in established attitudes, practices and institutions. 
 
Public health priorities typically receive limited support in resource-
constrained low-income countries, where health budgets are driven primarily 
by immediate health needs and vertical programs, and where finance 
ministries are often less inclined to support resource commitments for longer-
term payoffs. Despite evidence of high economic rate of return on investments 
in preparedness, the health and related ministries are usually not very 
successful in securing the funding needed. When the competition for domestic 
and donor resources is fierce, advocates of preparedness must excel in making 
their case. In the words of Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Minister of Finance, 
Government of Nigeria and presently the Chair of the Board of Gavi, the Vaccine 
Alliance, “Ministers of Health and the health community in general really need 
to learn to speak the language of Finance Ministers.”10  
 
Preparing a Financing Proposal  
 
A robust and realistic financing proposal provides the essential bridge 
between having a costed and prioritized plan for reinforcing preparedness, 
and having an adequately-funded plan fully reflected in line items in the 
national budget. Developing a detailed financing proposal for preparedness is 
often a complex exercise because it cuts across so many different types of 
activity and different parts of government.  
 
First, spending on the capabilities and infrastructure required for 
preparedness typically cuts across multiple departments and budget priorities 
                                                        
10 Keynote address delivered by Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Chair of the Board of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 





within the health ministry. For example, some aspects of preparedness, such 
as front line disease surveillance, diagnostics and curative care, are 
intrinsically embedded within the primary care delivery and hospital systems. 
Other aspects, such as the most sophisticated biosafety and biosecurity 
procedures appropriate for the most lethal agents, national emergency plans 
and vaccine stockpiles, are typically established via specialist entities at a 
national level. Furthermore, other priority health initiatives, such as 
combatting anti-microbial resistance or tackling endemic infections like 
malaria or tuberculosis, may overlap with or inadvertently compete with the 
preparedness agenda. It is important that preparedness does not become yet 
another vertical silo, but complements and contributes to these other 
objectives, forming part of the broader agenda of health system strengthening.  
 
Second, significant components of the preparedness agenda involve other 
government ministries, such as the ministries of agriculture, interior and 
trade. This inevitably triggers debates about which part of government should 
pay for which elements of the preparedness agenda. Coordination between the 
ministries of health and agriculture is particularly important given that so 
many infectious disease threats are zoonotic in origin. Reinforcing veterinary 
systems of surveillance and control of animal health can be an important part 
of strengthening of preparedness. 
 
Third, in many countries there is a division of responsibilities for different 
elements of preparedness between the national government and entities at a 
state, provincial or community level. This can create considerable scope for 
arguments about budget responsibilities.  
 
Fourth, the “preparing to respond” component of the preparedness agenda 
must be aligned with each government’s overall emergency response strategy, 
encompassing pandemic response alongside other risks including 
earthquakes and hurricanes. This inevitably involves multiple entities. 
According to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,11 the 
international accord on disaster risk reduction, “effective disaster risk 
reduction and management depends on coordination mechanisms within and 
across sectors and with relevant stakeholders at all levels, and it requires the 
full engagement of all state institutions of an executive and legislative nature 
at national and local levels and a clear articulation of responsibilities across 
public and private stakeholders, including business and academia, to ensure 
mutual outreach, partnership, complementarity in roles and accountability 
and follow-up” (UNISDR 2015). 
 
Fifth, where development assistance is involved, issues often arise around the 
trade-offs between domestic resourcing and development assistance, plus 
challenges in measuring and coordinating donor flows given different 
                                                        
11 The Sendai Framework, adopted by UN Member States on 18 March 2015 at the Third UN World 
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan, is a 15-year, voluntary, 
non-binding agreement which recognizes that the State has the primary role to reduce disaster risk but that 
responsibility should be shared with other stakeholders including local government, the private sector and 
other stakeholders. It aims for the substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and 
health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, 
communities and countries. 
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development partners’ distinct priorities and reporting requirements. Finance 
ministries may hold back committing domestic resources if they believe 
development assistance can be obtained for this purpose. Unless there is 
flexibility and coordination, development partner priorities can be difficult to 
reconcile with the country’s own plan. 
 
Sixth, where private sector health providers or non-governmental 
organizations play a critical role, decisions need to be made around the 
resourcing of these activities and their integration within the overall plan. 
Where private for-profit providers play a critical role in a country’s health care 
delivery, the answer may be to impose regulations requiring such providers 
deliver the relevant elements of the pandemic plan (such as disease 
surveillance for the patients they cover) at their own cost. Where non-
governmental agencies play a critical role, consideration must be given that 
these are funded sustainably. 
 
Finally, where regional networks and partnerships play an important role in 
strengthening preparedness, these often require distinct financing 
arrangements. Examples of regional initiatives for preparedness include the 
Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance, Southern Africa Center for Infectious 
Disease Surveillance, and the Middle East Consortium on Infectious Disease 
Surveillance.  
 
Given these dimensions of complexity, it should not surprise that many 
countries have struggled, or at least, taken considerable time, to translate the 
plans resulting from their JEE and PVS assessments into robust financing 
proposals. On top of costing the required improvements, it is necessary to 
allocate these costs across the different entities in a manner that fits with a 
country’s established budgeting principles and processes. Doing this 
rigorously involves mapping both the proposed additional investment and 
ideally, existing spend across multiple entities and at least 7 dimensions:  
 
(i) Administrative, legal, and regulatory measures at a national level that relate 
pandemic preparedness and response-readiness to all hazards, such as 
emergency operations center and communication systems. 
 
(ii) Capacities integrated within the established preventive and curative health 
services that play a critical role in protection against infectious disease 
outbreaks, such as the overall system for capturing disease incidence and 
standard diagnostic services. 
 
(iii) Stand-alone or specialized public health capabilities and infrastructure 
specifically dedicated to the identification, prevention, containment and 
response to infectious disease outbreaks, including biosafety/biosecurity 
arrangements, sophisticated laboratory services, and mechanisms for 
stockpiling vaccines, therapeutics and emergency equipment, plus relevant 
research and development capacities. 
 
(iv) Capacities being introduced or developed as part of other health initiatives, 
such as those directed against anti-microbial resistance, endemic diseases, or 




(v) Capacities within the veterinary health services relating to the identification 
and control of potentially zoonotic infections. 
 
(vi) Capabilities and infrastructure in sectors other than health and veterinary, 
such as agriculture, food, chemical, transport, etc., that relate to pandemic 
preparedness. 
 
There is no single, universally applicable approach to surmounting these 
challenges, since every country’s budgeting system and administrative 
arrangements is different. Yet, various tools are available. For example, the 
World Bank, with financial support from an Australia-led multi-donor trust 
fund, is developing a tool called the Health Security Financing Assessment 
Tool (HSFAT), which defines health security as the protection of human and 
animal health from infectious diseases and other public health risks and 
emergencies, and addresses health risks at the human-animal interface as it 
considers the prevent, detect, respond, and other IHR-related hazards. 
Structured in line with the JEE protocol, HSFAT examines important 
elements of the post-emergency or recovery phase of the response, and 
reviews coordination and implementation arrangements at national and 
subnational levels for pandemic preparedness and response efforts. HSFAT is 
currently being piloted in Vietnam with the intent to roll it out more broadly 
in the second half of 2017. 
 
Box 4.1 The Health Security Financing Assessment Tool 
 
The HSFAT is organized into seven sections: 
  
(i) Health Security Organization gathers essential information about current health security 
efforts, for example as identified by the JEE, to define the scope of necessary financing 
arrangements 
(ii) Stakeholder Mapping identifies the key players in health security in the country 
(iii) Institutional Assessment examines the functionality and appropriateness of coordinating 
mechanisms and implementation arrangements 
(iv) Macro-fiscal Context provides information on the country’s overall fiscal space to address 
health security financing 
(v) Financing for Health Security Budgeting and Resource Allocation reviews the budgeting, resource 
allocation and resource mobilization for health security 
(vi) Financing for Health Security Components assesses the funding for specific health security 
action packages as defined in the JEE 
(vii) Efficiency and Sustainability of health security financing examines issues related to 




Since it is important that investments in preparedness are integrated with a 
country’s overall healthcare expenditure planning, there would be merit in the 
World Bank and WHO working together to support countries, linking the 
HSFAT with the broader medium term expenditure framework, in the context 
of the National Health Accounts and preparedness sub-accounts being 




Recommendation 4: Depending on the national budget cycle, but ideally within 
three months of developing a prioritized and costed plan following JEE and PVS 
assessments, national governments should prepare a detailed financing proposal 
to support implementation of the plan to improve preparedness. 
 
Developing a compelling investment case and change management 
strategy 
 
While a costed, prioritized plan and robust financing proposal are essential 
prerequisites for securing sustainable funding for preparedness, experience 
suggests that they are not sufficient to obtain the money and deliver the plan. 
What is also required is a compelling investment case and a comprehensive 
change management strategy. 
 
The optimal mix of arguments to be used to make the investment case will 
vary from country to country, depending on the scale of additional investment 
required and the broader political and economic context. However, as shown 
in Exhibit 4.1 the arguments are likely to be based on four motivations: (i) 
ensuring economic stability and growth; (ii) contributing to universal health 
coverage; (iii) improving security and protecting social stability; and (iv) 
managing externalities to the regional and global community. Some 
stakeholders, such as the finance ministry, may worry most about the risks to 
economic stability and growth of the country, given the severe disruption 
infectious disease outbreaks can cause to everyday economic life, trade and 
investment. Others may be motivated more by the potential to save lives and 
contribute to the strength of the health system. Some constituencies may be 
concerned about the potential impact of pandemics, whether natural or as a 
result of bioterrorism, on a nation’s security, and more broadly on the need to 
protect governance and social stability. And finally, others, including 
neighboring countries and development partners, may be motivated by the 
positive effect investing in preparedness can have on reducing externalities for 
the regional and global community. 
 
In making the economic arguments, it will be much more powerful if economic 
estimates of the potential losses from pandemics at a global level can be 
translated into more regional or national estimates. While many countries will 






Given the cross-cutting, multi-stakeholder nature of preparedness, an 
effective change management strategy is also required to ensure successful 
delivery of even a well-funded plan. Multiple parts of government, the private 
sector and civil society must be engaged and coordinated to achieve the 
desired objectives. Formal mechanisms – clear processes, tools and systems, 
including financial incentives – are key to supporting implementation. At the 
same time, other important elements need to be in place, such as:  
 
(i) Buy-in and engagement of country leadership and other key influencers from 
the beginning of the diagnostic phase for sponsorship; normally, this starts 
with one sponsor in the country (e.g., the Prime Minister, Minister of Health, 
or other key actor); the country-level investment case mentioned above is key 
to support buy-in and understanding of the risks 
 
(ii) Mobilization of the right capabilities and expertise; this includes the creation 
of an attractive career path and learning opportunities for experts working on 
preparedness-related topics 
 
(iii) Inclusion of preparedness in the leadership’s agenda for communication with 
their citizens and with partners and stakeholders (including the private sector 
and civil society) within the country and in international forum 
 
There is no single, universally applicable approach to devising the investment 
case and change management strategy for a particular country. One practical 
approach is placed in Appendix D, which provides a framework and 




Recommendation 5: Each national government should develop an investment 
case, articulating the political and economic arguments for integrating the costed 
plan into national budget cycles and committing resources to reinforce and 
sustain preparedness, plus a change management strategy to engage and 
coordinate relevant stakeholders. 
 
Notwithstanding that countries move forward with recommendation 2-5, its 
implementation may well take us to end of 2018. The current Ebola outbreak 
in DR Congo and the weekly reports of public health events in Africa (WHO 
2017) suggest the urgency for countries to allocate some funds to 
preparedness already in the 2018 annual budget even before the IWG report 
is accepted and implemented and steps are put in place to generate 
incremental resources for preparedness.  
 
Identifying new sources of financing, both domestically and through external 
assistance, is a big challenge for resource-constrained economies. This is the 
focus of the next chapter, which examines how countries can mobilize and 
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5. Identifying Sources of Finance and Means of 
Mobilizing/Allocating Funds to Preparedness 
 
Government Spending on Health: Variations Across Countries 
 
There are vast differences across countries in how much of their public 
resources they spend on health, a metric that is a good proxy for the extent to 
which health is prioritized by governments.12 World Bank data suggests that 
in 2014 the share of health in aggregate government expenditure in 190 
countries ranged from 2.4 percent in Timor Leste to 27.9 percent in Andorra, 
with a mean of 11.8 percent. Unsurprisingly, higher income countries devote 
a larger share of government expenditure to health (17.8 percent in the high-
income OECD countries) than do lower-income countries (9.8 percent in the 
low-income IDA countries). 
 
However, significant variations exist in the share of health in total government 
spending even after controlling for national income. Among countries under 
$5,000 per capita income, health’s share of aggregate government spending 
ranges from a low of 2.4 percent in Timor-Leste to a high of 23.9 percent in 
Nicaragua. Low-income countries that allocate more to health from public 
resources than the IDA average of 9.8 percent include Rwanda, Madagascar, 
Uzbekistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, DRC, Burkina Faso, Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Zambia, Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Kenya, Lesotho, Burundi, 
Vietnam, Gambia, Malawi and Nicaragua. Likewise, there are many high-
income countries (>$10,000 per capita) that allocate less than the IDA 
average of 9.8 percent of aggregate government expenditure to health. These 
include Kuwait, Qatar, Malaysia, Oman, Brazil, Argentina, Gabon, Saudi 
Arabia, Russia, Seychelles and Latvia.13  
 
Empirical analyses do not provide good explanations for the observed 
variations in government prioritization of health. In a review of the sparse 
literature on cross-country comparisons, Tandon et al (2014) find that factors 
such as democratization, lower levels of corruption, ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity, and more women in public office appear to be correlated with 
higher shares of government spending on health. However, the authors note 
that these findings are sensitive to model specification. The study reports that 
countries that explicitly focus on expanding the breadth and depth of health 
coverage, as opposed to those that focus on budgetary targets only, are more 
likely to be able to prioritize and sustain allocations to health.  
 
Against this background of wide variations in national government health 
spending, this chapter focuses on mobilizing and allocating resources for 
                                                        
12 Government spending on health is probably a good proxy for spending on preparedness, on which good 
data are not available. 
13 The shares of government expenditure throw light only on the issue of prioritization, not on government 
health expenditure across countries, which depends not only on health’s share in the budget but also on 
the budget amount. Other factors that are important in any consideration of government spending on 
health are efficiency of allocations within the overall envelope and the extent to which public financing for 
health is pro-poor in its outlays. 
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preparedness. It explores options related to domestic resource mobilization, 
external development assistance, and the private sector, and it looks at 
innovative financing models countries may want to consider.  
 
Scale of Financing Required for Preparedness 
 
Estimates of financing required for preparedness vary dramatically, 
depending on whether underlying health system capacities need to be 
strengthened first or whether only limited set of specific preparedness 
capacities must be created. The post-JEE costing exercises in Tanzania and 
Pakistan suggest that just $0.5 to $1 per capita per year may suffice. An 
analysis of self-assessed requirements under IHR in several other countries, 
such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Indonesia, also result in similar modest 
estimates.  
 
Yet the investments required will be much higher if underlying clinical 
capacities must be built first, especially where it is necessary to: build and 
equip new facilities or reconstruct damaged or destroyed facilities; provide 
training and hire health workers; secure commodities and supplies required 
to deliver a basic package of services; create a logistics system including 
emergency relief for protracted emergencies; strengthen local governance 
structures; introduce financial management systems and health information 
systems. In a detailed analysis of a sample of 43 lower and middle income 
countries without the foundations for emergency preparedness capacity, 
Soucat et al (2017) calculate resource needs in the range of $15-$30 per capita 
per year for low-income and fragile states.  
 
In general, the investments required for preparedness will vary significantly  
across countries depending on whether: (i) they already have reasonably well-
functioning health systems, that just need a stronger overlay of specific 
preparedness capacities; (2) they need to fix underlying deficiencies in the 
health systems and then integrate preparedness capacities; and (3) they are 
fragile or failed states, and lack even the very basic systems components, 
which must be created before preparedness can be meaningfully addressed. 
For these reasons, and because it is difficult to get a precise assessment of the 
amounts already being spent, it is difficult to come up with a single figure for 
the additional investments required. However, the range of $1.9-3.4 billion 
per year suggested by the NAM Commission is probably not far off the mark. 
Incremental investments of this scale would certainly enable significant 
improvements in universal health security. 
 
Domestic vs. International Funding: Basic Principles 
 
As a fundamental principle, countries should aim to increase their domestic 
spend on development and specifically health, including preparedness, to 
maximize country ownership and self-reliance over time. This idea has been 
articulated in many settings: for example, the commitment of African Union 
countries to allocate 15 percent of their national budgets to improve the health 
sector (Abuja declaration 2001), and the partnership for improved domestic 




Whenever international development assistance is deployed, it should focus 
on “catalytic” activities or activities that have high global externalities and low 
domestic demand. Catalytic activities allow a step change in a country’s level 
of preparedness. These are expected to be mostly one-off costs – but can also 
be recurring costs, if these are critical to establish capacities in the countries, 
or if executing certain functions at a centralized level enables scale efficiencies. 
Activities with high global externalities and low domestic return are those that 
promise high impacts for global risk mitigation but may be deprioritized in 
countries without international support. 
 
Regional entities and neighboring countries can play an important role in 
providing technical and financial support for preparedness activities in cases 
where they can add value through: coordination (e.g., the establishment of the 
Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance network and Africa CDC); economies of 
scale (e.g., joint drug procurement in Central America by SICA); or sharing 
expertise. 
 
The private sector should also be included across the entire preparedness 
planning process, and its expertise should be leveraged in carrying out 
planning activities. 
 
Domestic Resource Mobilization for Preparedness 
 
Governments that want to invest in preparedness need to generate additional 
fiscal space for health in ways that increase public spending in the desired 
areas of attention without jeopardizing the government’s long-term financial 
sustainability. The simplest way of generating additional financing for 
preparedness is by increasing its allocation at the expense of spending on 
other activities. But this is not always practical, both because of the difficulties 
associated with agreeing which activities to stop financing and because of the 
high unmet demand for increased investments in other public-good 
interventions.  
 
Improved Tax Collection 
 
The search for additional resources therefore requires an assessment of other 
sources of fiscal space, such as a conducive macro-fiscal environment 
following high rates of economic growth, higher tax collections, increased 
borrowing, higher levels of development assistance, and savings generated by 
increased efficiency in current areas of public spending. All these potential 
sources of fiscal space are equally applicable to health and other sectors, and 
it is therefore important that countries express their specific commitment to 
preparedness through the portion of new public finance they are willing to 
allocate to it. 
 
We believe that domestic resource mobilization (DRM) is the key to 
development. We welcome the historic agreement reached at the United 
Nations Third International Conference on Financing for Development held 
in Addis Ababa in July 2015, in which countries agreed to an array of measures 
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aimed at widening the revenue base, improving tax collection, and combatting 
tax evasion and illicit financial flows. The modality of domestic resource 
expenditures is also important; governments must establish national control 
mechanisms and transparent public procurement frameworks, while ensuring 
equal participation and transparency in budgeting processes.  
 
Some countries with positive macroeconomic prospects show sizeable space 
for increasing public spending on health by as much as 1 percent of GDP, even 
without increasing the share of health in the budget (Barroy et al 2016). In the 
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, public spending on health could 
almost double if the favorable economic growth forecasts are realized (Barroy 
et al 2014). Likewise, countries like Myanmar, which is growing at 6.4 percent, 
will also increase public spending on health without altering the budget share. 
In countries like Guinea, however, economic stagnation following the Ebola 
epidemic will result in contraction in overall revenue growth and thus also 
reduce public spending on health (Barroy et al 2016).  
 
Strengthening domestic resource mobilization, however, is not just a question 
of raising revenue; it is also about designing a tax system that promotes 
inclusiveness, encourages good governance, matches society’s views on 
appropriate income and wealth inequalities, and promotes social justice. 
Taxation, which is integral to strengthening the effective functioning of the 
state and to the social contract between governments and citizens, provides 
governments with the funds needed to invest in development, relieve poverty 
and deliver public services. It offers an antidote to aid dependence in 
developing countries and provides fiscal reliance and sustainability that is 
needed to promote growth. We believe that governments should apply 
progressive tax systems, make collection processes more efficient, and 
increase tax compliance (IMF 2015). Through tax reform, countries can 
broaden their tax base and work towards integrating the informal sector with 
the formal economy.  
 
How Much Is Enough? 
 
There is no single target tax ratio that would be appropriate to all countries. 
However, there is increasing evidence that it is hard to secure lasting economic 
growth with a tax ratio below 15 percent of GDP (Gaspar, Jaramillo and 
Wingender 2016). Despite marked increases in tax ratios in the last two 
decades, in which median tax revenues in low-income countries increased by 
4.3 percent of GDP (IMF, OECD, WBG, 2016), the median tax ratio level in 
low-income countries remains at only 13 percent, which is just two-fifths of 
the level in OECD countries (33.8 percent). Half of sub-Saharan African 
countries still mobilized less than 17 percent of their GDP in tax revenues in 
2014, below the minimum level of 20 percent that the UN considered 
necessary to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Tax revenue as 
percentage of GDP for IDA countries (70 out of 77 for which data is available) 
shows that, in 2014, 30 countries collected less than 15 percent and 55 
countries less than 20 percent of their GDP (IMF 2014). 
 
Experts agree that there is considerable potential to increase tax revenue in 
developing countries (European Parliament 2014). An econometric analysis 
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(comparing performance in differing countries) suggests that many low-
income countries could increase their tax ratios by 2–4 percent of GDP (IMF 
2011). A common element of success stories is sustained political commitment 
at the highest levels: even administrative reforms can prompt strong 
opposition. Reforms must be entrenched, however, to avoid subsequent 
slippage (McIntyre 2007). As countries move to strengthen their tax systems 
and improve revenue collections, development partners may lend support. 
OECD, for example, has supported governments by fielding “tax inspectors 
without borders”, and the IMF is providing technical assistance in the revenue 
area in some 130 member countries. 
 
Earmarked Taxes to Finance Preparedness 
 
Another way in which countries can create additional fiscal space for 
preparedness is through earmarking. The basic idea is to use specific taxes for 
specific purposes. This can take the form of specific taxes for specific end uses 
(such as mandatory health insurance premiums), or specific taxes for general, 
unspecified uses (such as alcohol taxes) or general taxes for specific uses (such 
as devoting a fixed percentage of general taxes to a specific program). A 
distinction can also be made between “actual” and “notional” earmarking. 
Actual earmarking is a rigid version, in which funds are channeled 
mechanically to their assigned use (health or public transportation or 
whatever else), with no possibility of adjustment based on changing 
circumstances. Notional earmarking builds in more flexibility in the allocation 
of funds, but for that reason is less protective against subsequent diversions. 
 
Advantages of Earmarking  
 
Earmarking is a contentious issue. We will start by considering several 
advantages policy makers have found in earmarked taxes. First, visibility 
associated with earmarked taxes serves to highlight the priority that the 
government accords to the relevant policy issues. Where domestic revenues 
are being collected for new health services or programs that are not well 
known or understood, earmarked taxes may provide an opportunity to 
enhance the public’s understanding of the costs associated with a service 
delivered. Second, earmarked taxes for health can protect revenues destined 
for social services that might otherwise be allocated elsewhere during the 
policy and budget process. This is particularly relevant for countries with weak 
oversight of budget expenditures and where special interests and corrupt 
practices can influence budget allocations. Third, where earmarked taxes 
facilitate a tighter linking between financing for health and services delivered 
and received, public spending will achieve greater allocative efficiency. This 
will also facilitate a more transparent budgeting process and enhance the 
public’s perception that taxes received by the government are tied to a 
perceivable social benefit. In addition, where these ties are overtly evident, 
political pressure may enhance accountability of governments to render 
services promised (Cashin et al 2017).  
 
Thus, depending on the political and economic context, countries may find 
that earmarked taxes can increase revenue protection, allocative efficiency, 
public compliance, government accountability, and people’s understanding of 
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the costs associated with services, without excessively constraining funding 
flexibility.  
 
In situations where public finance management processes offer little 
opportunity for mid-cycle adjustments and where potential revenues from 
earmarked taxes can be placed in an extra-budgetary fund, earmarked taxes 
for health may actually enhance governments’ ability to respond and augment 
budgeting allocations for health.  In some circumstances, earmarked taxes can 
be a means of counteracting negative externalities associated with certain high 
risk behaviors, such as smoking and alcohol consumption, by increasing 
funding for the associated health ailments and costs (Cashin et al 2017; 
Tandon et al 2014). The long-term impacts of these taxes on health-risk 
behaviors remain to be confirmed. However, recent country examples show 
that such earmarked taxes (“sin taxes”) may initially decrease people’s 
incentives to purchase health-compromising products, especially cigarettes. 
These taxes potentially reduce people’s risk of suffering diseases associated 
with consumption of the dangerous products (Tandon et al 2014). However, 
the fact that sin taxes help reduce the consumption of, for example, tobacco 
and associated disease risks has nothing to do with whether the taxes are 
earmarked or not. Indeed, most countries have sin taxes which are not 
earmarked to health. 
 
The Downsides of Earmarking 
 
Reduced flexibility, economic distortions, and the pro-cyclical nature of 
earmarked taxes are some of the problems noted in the literature. Earmarking 
by definition reduces flexibility in the budget process, and could also reduce 
the influence of policy making on budget allocations. For example, budget 
processes that are shaped by mid-term policymaking may become less 
flexible, and countries with weak mechanisms for ensuring coordination 
across different social sectors may encounter increases in fragmentation of 
financing, adverse distributional effects, and potential inability to increase 
revenue. Earmarking can discourage the use of the commodity or activity 
being taxed, and thus create a distortion in the economy.  
 
In addition, since budgets are fungible, earmarking one revenue source 
(channeling it to a health initiative, for example) could be offset by cuts in 
other sources, as a result of which earmarking would not bring about a 
significant and sustained increase in resources for the program or initiative 
being supported by the tax (Cashin et al 2017). Indeed, Barro et al (2016), in a 
qualitative review of 35 studies on fiscal space for health, finds little evidence 
to support the prospective role of earmarked funds in expanding fiscal space 
for the health sector. Instead, it identifies economic growth, budget 
reprioritization, and efficiency measures as the main drivers of fiscal space for 
health expansion  
 
Earmarking in Country Practice  
 
Real-world practice does not necessarily follow policy experts’ prescriptions. 
Notwithstanding the advantages and drawbacks of earmarked taxes as 
analyzed in the literature, at least 80 countries worldwide utilize earmarked 
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taxes for health in some capacity. Some countries utilize earmarked taxes for 
health to finance a national health initiative, such as Ghana, Estonia, and the 
Philippines, which earmark part of their revenues for national health 
insurance. South Africa utilizes earmarked taxes for health to mobilize 
domestic resources for the national HIV/AIDS epidemic. More than 20 
countries earmark tobacco tax revenue specifically for health. Several 
countries earmark all their revenues for health, while others, like Mongolia, 
Thailand, Qatar, Tuvalu and Bulgaria, earmark a small percentage. Some 
countries, like Thailand and the Philippines, earmark a small portion of tax 
revenues from alcohol to health (Cashin et al 2017, Tandon et al 2014, WHO 
2009)  
 
Country experiences of revenue generation with earmarked taxes vary. A study 
of eleven countries by the Japan-World Bank Partnership Program on UHC 
examined the relationship between political commitments to UHC, financial 
commitments facilitated by earmarked taxes for UHC, and the generation of 
revenues for UHC. The analysis turned up little evidence that earmarked 
financing is associated with enhanced domestic revenues for UHC, overall 
(Maeda et al 2014). However, some countries showed quite positive results 
with earmarking. Thailand, for example, which has a substantial informal 
sector, has struggled to raise sufficient domestic revenues for UHC via payroll 
taxes alone, and has found success with earmarked taxes on general revenues 
(Maeda et al 2014).  
 
WHO case studies on earmarking tobacco taxes in Botswana, Egypt, Iceland, 
Romania, Poland, Philippines, Viet Nam, Thailand, and Panama indicate 
some potential for increased domestic revenues. However, this potential must 
be contextualized by the share of government expenditure on health generated 
by this financing mechanism – from a low of 0.001 percent in Poland to a high 
of 1.3 percent in Panama. The introduction of tobacco sin taxes in the 
Philippines has been associated with an increase in revenues for health. 
However, some difficulties during the application of new revenues towards 
health services have arisen both in the Philippines and in Botswana. The 
problems result primarily from weaknesses in the public finance management 
processes (Cashin et al 2017).  
 
Two studies provide precise quantification of the potential effect of earmarked 
taxes. A fiscal space study undertaken in Peru notes that the tax rate on 
tobacco products, which is just 37.8 percent of the retail price, could generate 
fiscal space equivalent to approximately 0.02 percent of GDP if the tax rate on 
tobacco products were increased to the average price in Latin America (Matus 
et al 2015). Another study finds that increasing excise taxes on tobacco in 
Gabon could expand revenues by 0.05 percent of GDP (Saleh et al 2014). 
 
The Bottom Line: Earmarking for Preparedness Could be  
a Reasonable Option 
 
We believe that countries should seriously explore the use of earmarked taxes 
to generate additional fiscal space for preparedness. This would be especially 
important in countries with low tax-to-GDP ratio or where certain sectors are 
not taxed. Industries and activities that contribute to increasing pandemic 
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risk, such as antibiotic use for growth promotion in meat production, and 
those that stand to gain the most from investments in pandemic preparedness, 
such as tourism, are good candidates for earmarked taxes. Even though 
budgets are fungible and over the long term increases in earmarked taxes can 
be offset by cuts from other sources, the allocation of funds can be a first step 
towards raising the profile and visibility of the issue and moving towards a 
sustainable way of financing preparedness at the national level. Therefore, the 
sectors involved in pandemic preparedness should continue their advocacy 
work to maintain or increase their resources. However, we recommend that 
countries examine all the pros and cons of taxing these industries and 
activities, including the price elasticities of demand and supply, and take a 
considered decision based on their specific-country contexts.   
 
Recommendation 6: To increase fiscal space, national governments should 
examine ways of generating incremental domestic resources to finance 
preparedness, whether by (i) improving overall tax design and collection; or (ii) 
introducing earmarked taxes where they might be an effective way to generate 
additional resources. 
 
Mobilizing Development Assistance for Preparedness 
 
For most countries, domestic resources are the best solution for financing 
preparedness. However, development assistance will also play a powerful role 
in creating and strengthening preparedness capacities in some contexts. It is 
important that development assistance for preparedness be focused on the 
right countries and activities, and that the delivery of donor funds be well 
harmonized across donors and well aligned with national priorities. Whenever 
possible, donor support must be used deliberately to catalyze sustainable 
domestic financing.  
 
The G7 nations and many individual donor countries have made explicit 
commitments to support preparedness. By delivering on these promises, 
donor countries will reinforce a critical global public good. Many donor 
countries and organizations are already engaged in financing preparedness 



















Box 5.1 Current Donor Support for Preparedness 
 
Donors contribute significant sums to strengthening prevention, preparedness and response 
capacities in developing countries. Data for 2015 from OECD’s Creditor Reporting Survey 
(CRS)14 and the G-Finder survey,15 show that the top 9 donors – United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Canada, Japan, Australia, Korea, Norway16 and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
– contributed over US$ 4 billion to preparedness activities in 2015 alone.17 This funded seven 
major preparedness functions: capacity strengthening, response, treatment and case management, 
governance and stewardship, education and behavior change, activities in the veterinary sector, 
and Research and Development (R&D). 
 
The United States accounts for over 60 percent of total disbursements, followed by the United 
Kingdom (13 percent), and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (10 percent). The remaining 
donors – Canada, Japan, Australia, Korea and Norway – account for the balance 17 percent. 
 
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are by far the largest beneficiaries. Most of the disbursements 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan go to Nigeria, which is also the second 
largest recipient of donor fund from Canada and Norway. Nigeria, which received $220 million 
in 2015, is the largest recipient of all donor flows for preparedness, followed by Uganda ($89 
million), Kenya ($75 million), Malawi ($66 million), India ($64 million), Tanzania ($64 million), 
South Africa ($ 62 million), Mali ($61 million), Afghanistan ($58 million) and Ethiopia ($57 
million).  
 
Forty-two percent of donor financing went to R&D, followed by capacity strengthening (31 
percent), and response (10 percent). The balance 17 percent supported treatment and case 
management, governance and stewardship, education and behavior change and agriculture and 
unspecified activities. Of the $2.5 billion non-R&D flows, $1.8 billion went to support activities 
that focused on malaria ($754 million), Ebola ($441 million), polio ($313 million), tuberculosis 
($214 million), and Avian Influenza ($36 million).  
 
  
                                                        
14 The CRS database records individual development assistance flows from OECD donor countries to 
developing countries. The database is organized by recipient country, recipient region and sector of 
disbursement, such as health or agriculture, and categorized by different taxonomies relating to that sector. 
For the health sector, the first sub-category is basic health or health general, followed by purpose, such as 
infectious disease control or health personnel training. 
15 The G-Finder database is compiled from a survey on country R&D spending on Neglected Diseases. 
The survey includes information on the disease and differs from the CRS in that it details investments to 
domestic research institutes and think-tanks as well as investments in R&D in developing counties. 
16 The analysis considers eight donor countries that account for 85% of total health development assistance 
disbursements for 2015 in the CRS database 
17 Estimated duplicated reported spending between the two databases is deducted from the CRS database. 
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Priorities for Donor Investments in Preparedness 
 
We propose that donors adopt the following three priorities for funding 
preparedness activities: 
 
(i) Capital investments or one-off expenditures in poorer countries, where 
such expenditures can work catalytically. Wherever possible, beneficiary 
countries should then be prepared to shoulder recurrent expenditures. 
(ii) Regional spending on shared resources. Funding at this level can be critical 
for functions and tools such as cross-border disease surveillance and 
laboratory facilities. While critically important, these are sometimes difficult 
to fund from domestic budgets.  
(iii) Creating baseline preparedness and prevention capacities in fragile and 
conflict-affected states, war zones, or other settings where these basic 
capacities are simply absent and must be built from the ground up, before 
meaningful preparedness activities can even begin.  
 
In all cases, development should seek to support the financing of preparedness 
through the national health security plans and budgets emanating from the 
JEE process, and use the JEE criteria as benchmarks of achievement. 
Wherever possible development partners should seek to secure commitments 
from recipient governments around matching and ongoing funding so as to 
maximize the impact of the development assistance. 
 
The ongoing JEE and planning exercises offer enhanced opportunities to 
donors and recipients alike in channeling development assistance resources 
to critical areas of preparedness. The costing and financing exercises 
conducted by countries after JEEs provide an objectively assessed and 
validated enunciation of resource requirements for strengthening 
preparedness. The rigorous process of diagnostic, planning, and costing 
initiated with the JEE assessment should serve to strengthen the investment 
case that recipient countries need to make for additional funding support. 
Likewise, it should also give confidence to donor countries that their support 
will fund gaps identified by objective external experts. 
 
Closely related is the issue of measuring preparedness. We suggest using a mix 
of indicators that would be useful, both for a country’s internal purposes in 
monitoring and improving system performance, and as a way for partners to 
understand how a country is progressing in its capacity to prevent, detect, and 
control disease outbreaks. This could include some combination of process, 
output and outcome indicators. Process indicators are those that assess 
countries’ progress in planning, costing, and financing preparedness 
activities. For example, a process indicator could be a completed NAPHS, with 
clear timelines, ownership, and implementation plans. Output indicators, 
which measure a country’s progress in implementing specific activities 
identified in the NAPHS, could be linked to the prioritized activities identified 
by the NAPHS that could move a country from one JEE level to the next. 
Exhibit 5.1 provides an illustration. And finally, outcome indicators, which are 
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tied to the impact that outputs have on infectious disease outbreaks, could 
include the frequency and impact of infectious disease outbreaks in the period 





Strengthening Regional Preparedness 
 
A disease outbreak in a country has costly consequences not only for itself, but 
also for its neighbors and the global community. Knowing this, an individual 
country acting in its own interest and by itself may be motivated to 
underinvest in the prevention of infectious diseases, because: (i) it would 
expect its neighbors and the global community to share in the costs of 
preparedness since all neighboring countries would stand to benefit from 
investments by each country in that neighborhood cluster; and (ii) it would 
expect richer countries to invest, since they stand to lose relatively more in the 
event of an outbreak. Regional preparedness provides a classic public good – 
it mobilizes investments that the market will not and in which countries 
under-invest. And it is cheaper to develop high-level expertise at the regional 
multi-country rather than at the level of an individual country. Thus, one 
priority area that we have identified for investment by development partners 
is regional preparedness.  
 
Recent events have revealed gaps in preparedness at the regional level in some 
settings, highlighting the containment opportunities that can be lost when 
protective systems at this level fail. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014-
15 not only exposed weaknesses in the public health surveillance, 
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preparedness, and response systems of the three affected countries; it also 
emphasized the importance of regional collaboration and underscored the 
need for a more harmonized approach to disease surveillance and response 
for potential cross-border disease outbreaks. The Ebola epidemic began in 
Guinea, but rapidly spread to neighboring countries. Containment was 
hampered by the absence of systematic collection, reporting, and exchange of 
surveillance and laboratory data across national borders in real time. 
 
Recognizing this, the World Bank is investing $450 million in West Africa in 
the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) 
Program (Box 5.2). The program finances regional-level policy dialogue and 
activities that will promote information exchange, timely collective action, and 
efficient use of country and shared resources, such as reference labs, training 
institutions, and commodity stockpiles, for disease surveillance and response. 
It also provides countries with financing that is under their direct control to 
rapidly address identified priorities. This mechanism should help countries 
respond to potential pandemics at the first signs of the outbreak.  
 
WHO is also providing Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other West African 
countries with support to develop and strengthen regional disease 
surveillance and response. WHO assists these countries in assessing, 
restructuring, and strengthening integrated country-level preparedness 
systems.  
 
Box 5.2 The West Africa Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement 
(REDISSE) Program 
 
The REDISSE Program is an interdependent series of projects to strengthen national, regional 
and cross-sectoral capacity for integrated disease surveillance and response in West Africa. It is 
financed by a combination of IDA credits and grants, with co-financing through multi and single 
donor trust funds. The Program allows countries to access both country and regional IDA 
financing, such that for every dollar of IDA allocated to the Program from the country IDA 
envelope, one to two dollars is allocated from the regional IDA envelope.  
 
Total proposed financing for the REDISSE Program is estimated to be US$450 million of which 
US$261 million has been committed under the first two projects in the Program in support of 
preparedness activities in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria and 
Togo (Benin and Cote d’Ivoire are confirmed to join in the third project). In order to ensure that 
the human-animal-environment interface is addressed and the One Health approach is central to 
project design and implementation, the Program has been developed jointly by the World Bank’s 
Health and Agriculture practices with two main objectives: (i) to address systemic weaknesses 
within the animal and human health systems that hinder effective cross sectoral and cross border 
collaboration for disease surveillance and response; and (ii) in the event of an eligible emergency, 
to provide immediate and effective response to said eligible emergency. Areas supported by 
REDISSE include surveillance and information systems; strengthened laboratory capacity; 
epidemic preparedness and rapid response; workforce training, deployment and retention; and 
institutional capacity building for project management, coordination and advocacy.  
 
The REDISSE Program builds upon partnerships at the global and regional level and promotes 
partnership and collaborative approaches at the national and subnational levels. Consultations 
with other partners have been extensive, and includes WHO, OIE, US CDC, USAID, BMGF, 
Canada and China. 
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The World Bank is also supporting a regional laboratory-strengthening 
initiative in East Africa. The $129 million East Africa Public Health Laboratory 
Networking Project is helping Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Burundi establish a network of efficient, high quality, accessible public health 
laboratories for the diagnosis and surveillance of TB and other communicable 
diseases in the East African Community member states. The project supports 
32 facilities across the five countries, of which 26 are hospital-based satellite 
laboratories located in cross border districts, with the aim of enhancing access 
to diagnostic services, expanding disease surveillance and emergency 
preparedness efforts, and serving as a platform for learning, knowledge 
sharing, and training. 
 
We believe that development assistance should further emphasize regional 
approaches to strengthening preparedness. Increased financial flows in 
support of regional initiatives will help countries reap economies of scale and 
other efficiencies by acting collectively in pursuit of common objectives 
through trans-border collaboration and cooperation. The World Bank already 
dedicates IDA resources for regional projects and provides them to countries 
on a concessional basis, in order to encourage countries to adopt regional 
solutions to shared national problems. We encourage other development 
partners to follow suit.  
 
Other development banks can make especially important contributions. 
Regional multilateral development banks are well placed to support regional 
initiatives on preparedness. Development banks can see that features such as 
regional laboratory networks and disease surveillance systems are critical 
components of countries’ risk management infrastructure, and these banks 
can plan their lending and investments accordingly. 
 
The IWG further proposes that a discussion be initiated on including 
preparedness as an individual item in the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC). Such a move would enable better monitoring of development partners’ 
support for preparedness. It would facilitate holding development partners 
accountable for the commitments they make and create a forum for regular 
discussion of preparedness financing issues among stakeholders. 
 
Recommendation 7: Development partners should fulfill and build on existing 
collective and bilateral commitments to help finance preparedness in countries 
needing support, focusing on: (i) in-country capital investments and one-off 
spends; (ii) multi-country regional initiatives; and (iii) failed and fragile states 
where domestic resourcing is not a realistic option. To maximize the catalytic 
impact of their assistance, development partners should structure their support to 
the health security plans emanating from the JEE process and encourage national 
governments to match investments and commit to ongoing financing from 
domestic resources. 
 
Engaging the Private Sector in Financing Preparedness 
 
Investment in preparedness against outbreaks of infectious diseases and 
antimicrobial resistance is generally financed through the public purse. Such 
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funding is constrained by fiscal capacity and the inevitable budget trade-offs 
among competing priorities. Private sector companies (including the whole 
range of business enterprises spanning manufacturing, services, 
transportation, agriculture, and natural resources) have much to lose from 
disease outbreaks, but typically make little direct financial contribution to 
preparedness. We believe that this must change. 
 
Business and Preparedness: Untapped Opportunities 
 
To date, companies have generally made very limited contributions to 
financing preparedness. There are two broad reasons for this. First, private 
sector companies lack adequate awareness of the risks of infectious outbreaks 
(including drug-resistant strains), and tend to underestimate those risks. Only 
those that have directly experienced disruption to customers, supply chain, 
and workforce from such causes attach much weight to such risks. Second, 
private sector companies find it difficult to justify investments in public goods, 
such as national disease surveillance systems, national vaccination programs, 
national laboratory networks, and national emergency operations centers, 
because these do not generate profits for their shareholders. It is therefore 
important that a case is made to show that preparedness is a good investment 
for business – which is likely to attract attention of private companies. Private 
sector companies do fund philanthropic/corporate social responsibility 
activities, but these are typically limited in scale.  
 
Where a company is aware of the risks from infectious diseases, it might well 
make specific investments in its own preparedness – e.g., protecting its 
workforce or enhancing the resilience of its supply chain – where the private 
benefits justify the spend, but it is unlikely to invest significantly in broader 
public goods, unless industry associations or the government can overcome 
the collective action problem. While the lack of awareness can be tackled, the 
fact that much of pandemic preparedness involves the creation of public goods 
is intrinsic – and why most public health spend is financed through 
government. A deeper understanding of shared value and collective impact of 




There are a variety of possible solutions to this problem, though none is a 
“silver bullet.” First, it is important to build greater awareness of disease 
outbreak risks among private sector companies. This is a prerequisite for any 
other action, since making companies more aware of the risks will likely make 
them less resistant to potential taxes or regulations. It will encourage them to 
reinforce their own resilience, and will facilitate their engagement in 
preparatory planning with government agencies, particularly where they have 
relevant assets or capabilities. Greater awareness may be achieved through 
such means as observing “pandemic awareness” days and running simulation 
exercises.  
 
Second, private sector companies can be required to invest in certain aspects 
of preparedness through regulation. In other arenas, the financing of risk 
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mitigating actions is largely achieved through imposing the costs on the 
private sector through regulation. For example, banks are required to commit 
vast amounts of capital and spend significant sums to reduce the risk of 
financial crises, and often pay levies to fund the regulatory agencies that 
oversee them (Box 5.3). In theory, similar approaches could be applied to 
mitigating the risks of disease outbreaks. Companies could be required to 
ensure a basic minimum level of protection for their employees. Companies 
whose activities contribute to the risk of outbreaks – such as food producers 
– could be required to invest in capabilities and infrastructure to reduce such 
risks. The challenge here is that in many of the countries where the risk of 
infectious disease outbreaks is high, the proportion of people employed by the 
formal private sector is very small, and the market share of such companies in 
key industries like food production is also minute. Imposing regulations like 
those described would have little real impact in reducing risks (and to the 
extent that it disadvantaged the formal private sector, could increase the risk). 
 
Third, governments can encourage or mandate corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) spending dedicated to preparedness. India, for example requires larger 
companies to commit at least 2 percent of their profits to corporate social 
responsibility. Indonesia has also mandated CSR. Further, governments can 
encourage corporate philanthropy by giving public recognition or matching 
funds for private contributions toward preparedness. The challenge, however, 
is that companies typically prefer to devote their philanthropic activities to 
projects with more visible outcomes.  
 
Box 5.3 Deposit Insurance 
 
Explicit deposit insurance is a measure implemented in many countries to protect bank 
depositors, in full or in part, from losses caused by a bank’s inability to pay its debts when due. 
Deposit insurance institutions are for the most part government run or established, and may or 
may not be a part of a country’s central bank. In some instances, they may also be private entities 
with government backing, or completely private entities. Many national deposit insurers are 
members of the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), an international 
organization established to contribute to the stability of financial systems by promoting 
international cooperation and to encourage wide international contact among deposit insurers 
and other interested parties. According to the IADI, 125 countries have instituted some form of 
explicit deposit insurance.  
 
The United States is one of the first countries to have implemented a deposit insurance scheme. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which is a government corporation, 
provides deposit insurance for depositors at US banks. The FDIC was created by the 1933 
Banking Act during the Great Depression to restore trust in the American banking system. More 
than one-third of banks failed in the years preceding establishment of the FDIC, and bank runs 
were common. Since the passage of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in 2011, the FDIC insures deposits in member banks up to US $250,000 per 
ownership category. The FDIC and its reserves do not receive public funds; member banks’ 
insurance dues are the FDIC's primary source of funding.  
 
Several African countries employ deposit insurance institutions. In Uganda, deposit insurance is 
part of the National Bank. In Sudan and Kenya, deposit insurance institutions are part of their 
Central Banks. Zimbabwe utilizes a deposit insurance countries corporation. In all cases, these 
institutions are primarily funded with premium levies collected from member institutions. In 
Zimbabwe, for instance, the current annual premium rate is 0.2 percent of average eligible 
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deposits, and the premium is paid on a quarterly basis. The notion of requiring the banking 




Finally, governments can work with companies that can leverage existing 
assets and capabilities to contribute directly to preparedness. One example 
that is already being pursued is the use of cellular tower networks to provide 
distributed refrigeration capacity for vaccines. Another example is private 
sector healthcare providers, who must be integrated into national 
preparedness arrangements to ensure comprehensive disease surveillance 
and coordinated response planning. This would probably require a 
combination of regulation and practical cooperation, but in this way, private 
sector healthcare providers could contribute “in kind” to financing 
preparedness. Likewise, companies specializing in logistics and supply chains 
must also be integrated into strengthening delivery systems, which are an 
integral part of preparedness.  
 
Leveraging such corporate assets is a potentially powerful approach, since the 
private sector has significant infrastructure and capabilities, but making it 
work requires companies to understand the risks and preparedness 
requirements, and governments to understand what companies can 
contribute – plus an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. 
 
Vehicles for Business Collaboration in Preparedness 
 
Several alliances, forums, and other mechanisms exist that can be mobilized 
to help promote and coordinate private-sector engagement in preparedness 
efforts at global, national, and local levels. On the global stage, the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) may be an important facilitating platform. In local 
settings, chambers of commerce may serve as coordinating vehicles.  
 
The Private Sector Roundtable (PSRT) was instituted in 2015 to mobilize 
industry to help countries prepare for, detect, and respond to health-related 
crises, and strengthen systems for health security. The PSRT engages with 
governments and companies in the health care, communications, energy, 
finance, technology, transportation, logistics, and other sectors to support 
countries in reaching the goals of the GHSA’s 11 Action Packages. PSRT 
members align public health needs with business objectives, and are 
committed to leveraging their investments and infrastructure to protect 
employees and their families; to preserving the functioning of high quality 
health services for the entire population; and to maintaining assurance of 
economic development in the countries where they operate. 
 
The PSRT aims to be the central touchpoint for companies seeking to 
contribute to the aims of the GHSA, and to coordinate its efforts to promote 
global health security. It has identified several GHSA Action Packages, as well 
as cross-cutting priorities, which align with member companies’ capabilities 
and which have the potential to impact several Action Packages. These include 
supply chain and logistics; policy development and advocacy; workforce 




We see a role for the PSRT in mobilizing the private sector all over the world. 
The PSRT is well-positioned to identify industry-specific roles and 
contributions during pandemic preparedness and response phases, especially 
among companies involved in healthcare, financial services, transportation, 
logistics, and public relations, as well as other firms with widespread 
marketing networks. We believe that the PSRT should establish national 
chapters in all countries, which should include multinational, national, and 
local industry groups.  
 
In coordination with the public system, the national chapters of private 
companies should work toward building greater awareness of pandemic risks 
among their members, conduct periodic simulation exercises, and foster 
collaboration at the national and local levels for implementation of their roles 
and contributions of preparedness and response. 
 
Recommendation 8: National governments should incorporate the private sector 
into their strategy for reinforcing preparedness, through a combination of 
awareness-building, direct involvement in preparedness and response planning, 
and regulation. Where private sector companies contribute directly or indirectly 
to the risks of disease outbreak and spread by the nature of their business, 
national governments should introduce regulations requiring such companies to 
invest in risk mitigation and preparedness. 
 
Leveraging Insurance to Finance Preparedness 
  
The role of insurance in disaster response has been increasingly recognized 
over the past ten years. Contrary to traditional development assistance 
models, in which money invariably arrives too late, insurance can be designed 
such that it disburses very rapidly. For instance, it has been estimated that $1 
received quickly as a drought is recognized is worth $4 to $5 received after the 
lag associated with the traditional response process. The fast delivery of 
money, coupled with a pre-determined contingency plan, can be very effective 
in saving lives and livelihoods, and reducing the negative economic impact of 
the crisis (Clarke and Hill 2013). 
 
A New Science of Risk Management 
 
Insurance is not just about financial payment at times of loss but necessarily 
includes a whole system of risk identification, risk assessment, risk modelling, 
risk monitoring, risk preparedness, risk management, and contingency 
planning. Membership in an insurance scheme can include both requirements 
to meet certain standards of preparedness and incentives to further improve 
preparedness and reduce risk.  
 
The global catastrophe re/insurance market has been transformed over the 
past thirty years by an engagement with science and engineering. The process 
of catastrophe risk modelling has led not only to far greater knowledge of the 
hazards faced, but also of the property and people at risk and their 
vulnerability to the hazard events. The culture of active risk management 
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encoded into insurance of domestic, commercial, industrial, and technical 
risks—for example, refusing coverage if sprinklers are not installed or 
rewarding a firm that installs them with premium discounts—has spread 
throughout the industry. This greater knowledge has allowed the development 
of financial models that enable firms to assess the comparative cost and 
benefit of different risk management strategies. Metrics such as average net 
loss cost, the worst loss that may be expected every 10 years (a measure of 
impact on annual result), and the worst loss that can be expected every 200 
years (a measure of capital safety) have been broadly adopted. Regulators and 
rating agencies have embraced these metrics. Overall, the insurance industry 
has advanced in technical and scientific sophistication far beyond the earlier 
periods of its history. This has strengthened the industry financially – and 
made it an especially important partner for preparedness. 
 
Disaster Response Insurance: Regional Initiatives 
 
The value of disaster response insurance in the natural catastrophe field is 
proven. The first regional disaster response scheme, the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) was launched in 2007 offering 
insurance to governments against tropical cyclones and earthquakes. CCRIF 
is effectively a mutual insurance entity, operated on behalf of its member 
governments and protected by the international reinsurance market. Over its 
10 years of operation, CCRIF has paid out almost $70 million over 22 separate 
claims, in every case money being paid to member governments within 14 days 
of the event occurring. Governments receive confirmation that payment will 
be made within days of an event occurring, allowing them to pre-plan rather 
wait for an uncertain claim payment paid at an unspecified time in the future.  
 
Likewise, the African Risk Capacity (ARC), was created in 2014 to offer 
insurance policies to African countries against drought and tropical cyclone. 
As part of the design of ARC, an Agency of the African Union was created to 
help countries understand their risk, design appropriate insurance solutions, 
make appropriate contingency plans and, after a loss, review the contingency 
plans and monitor their implementation. Countries are not allowed to buy 
insurance products unless they have been through this process, with 
contingency plans and product design signed off by ARC Agency 
representatives. In 2014-15, ARC paid three West African countries a total of 
$26 million in response to a drought event. 
 
Insurance companies could potentially play a significant role in stimulating 
investment in preparedness. Pandemic insurance schemes do not directly 
contribute to financing preparedness, but are designed to ensure the 
availability of financial resources should an outbreak occur, which can 
facilitate rapid containment and overall resilience. The most powerful benefits 
of insurance from a risk reduction perspective tend to be: a) the additional 
insights that are generated by insurance providers into risk drivers and 
mitigants; and b) the incentives created for governments and private sector 
companies, which will be incentivized to take action to reduce the risks and 




Insurance Innovation: The Pandemic Emergency 
Financing Facility 
 
During 2015 and 2016, the World Bank and other partners developed the PEF, 
a parametric insurance fund across a range of diseases focused on IDA 
countries, with premiums being funded by donor nations. Through this 
initiative the World Bank and its partners have worked through many of the 
issues around the framework within which insurance fits, the structures of 
parametric triggers, the modelling of the risks, and the finding of insurance 
capacity. But all agree that the PEF is a pilot, a first step. For example, the PEF 
does not directly incentivize recipient countries to invest in preparedness in 
order to reduce premiums; is focused just on IDA countries; and has a limited 
basis of (re)insurance carrier support. Finally, the PEF was never intended to 
focus on the private sector operating in the risk regions, and so is silent on the 
opportunities to provide business interruption type insurance into the private 
sector, again to incent preparedness. 
 
In that context, there is an opportunity to build on this pilot to develop a PEF-
2 that directly incentivizes recipient country investment in preparedness by 
involving recipient countries in paying some portion of the premiums. This 
may mean broadening the focus beyond IDA countries and focusing on those 
that have already achieved a certain minimum standard against the JEE 
criteria. The priority in countries with fundamental gaps in preparedness and 
the underlying health system infrastructure should be to fund the rectification 
of these weaknesses. 
 
In addition, there is also an opportunity to extend the delivery of parametric 
insurance to the private sector. Broader take-up business interruption 
insurance that covered infectious disease risks would simultaneously increase 
economic resilience and create greater awareness of infectious disease risks 
among private sector leaders. The product offering would rely on the same 
data and analytical tools as the offering to governments. Here the challenge is 
to stimulate the demand since most companies underestimate the risks to 
their businesses.  
 
New partnerships between multilateral organizations and insurance firms 
may accelerate innovation. A promising collaborative platform is the 
Insurance Development Forum, set up in 2015 during the Paris Climate 
Summit as a public/private partnership between the insurance industry and 
international organizations. 
 
Recommendation 9: The Insurance Development Forum, the World Bank, and 
other partners should work together to: (i) develop the next iteration of the 
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF2) that specifically ties recipient 
countries’ investments in preparedness to relief of their contributions to PEF2 
premiums; (ii) deliver maximum participation from the insurance markets to 
provide capacity for PEF2; and (iii) investigate how insurance for business 
interruption resulting from disease outbreaks can be provided to private sector 
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Annex to Chapter 5 
 
Table A5.1 Donor Flows for Preparedness (Excluding HIV), US$ million (2015) 
Country Preparedness R&D Total 
United States 1,552 933 2,485 
United Kingdom 404 118 522 
Germany 116 48 164 
Canada 132 3 135 
Japan 142 10 152 
Australia 69 19 88 
Korea 18 0  19 
Norway 42 6 48 
BMGF  419 419 
Total 2,475 1,556 4,031 
 
 








































































R&D 973 187 89 7 10 19 1 6 419 
Capacity Strengthening  657 261 68 90 89 43 14 11 0 
Response 373 6 2 3 13 3 0 1 0 
Treatment/Case Management 46 46 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 
Governance/Stewardship 24 8 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 
Education& Behavior Change 7 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Agriculture 1 7 5 4 16 3 1 0 0 
Unspecified 404 8 0 6 23 20 2 26 0 






6. Incentivizing Countries to Prioritize Allocation of 
Funds to Preparedness 
 
A substantial reduction in the threat of pandemics can only happen if 
countries choose to invest and strengthen their national preparedness 
systems. To make such investments, governments need to be convinced that 
the costs associated with strengthening public health systems are a necessary 
expenditure in the context of competing demands for social and economic 
investment. The current under-preparedness of many countries suggests that 
this case has not been well made, despite the well-documented socioeconomic 
risks associated with infectious disease outbreaks. 
 
It can be challenging to convince politicians to spend money to help avoid 
something and cause it not to happen; after all, it is hard to claim credit for an 
investment that is successful only if nothing happens as a result. It is 
important, therefore, that Ministers of Finance see and feel the results of 
investments in preparedness in the present even as the same investments 
contribute to the prevention of ill effects later. One way of doing this is by 
developing indices or measures based on preparedness that influence the 
inflow of private capital. Another way is by using measures of preparedness to 
influence the flows of development assistance, such as from the concessional 
financing from the World Bank. 
 
Assessing Economic Vulnerability to Infectious Disease Outbreaks 
 
Infectious disease crises can have substantial effects on the economic stability 
and prosperity of countries they affect. Recent experiences demonstrate the 
macro-criticality of such outbreaks across a range of economic contexts. The 
countries hardest hit by the 2014-15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa suffered 
losses of approximately 5 percent of GDP (The World Bank 2015), whilst the 
2015 outbreak of MERS in South Korea resulted in over $1bn in lost economic 
activity (US Department of State 2016). Similar experiences followed the 
outbreaks of H1N1, SARS and Zika, and recent estimates put the expected 
global losses resulting from pandemic influenza at US$570 billion each year 
this century, about 0.7 percent of global GDP. Of note, none of these 
assessments include the substantial costs of failing to contain an outbreak that 
subsequently goes on to become endemic in a population, as happened with 
HIV, potentially resulting in losses an order of magnitude greater. 
 
Despite the huge economic and financial impact of infectious disease 
outbreaks, the scale of these impacts is not well known to decision makers 
responsible for prioritizing investment for public good. The World Bank and 
others have produced occasional thematic assessments of pandemic risk; 
however, these efforts have been sparse and not systematically linked to 
country policy and budgeting processes. The prevailing picture around 
macroeconomic assessments of risk and pandemic risk is one of neglect. An 
analysis of macroeconomic assessments undertaken of fifteen countries 
affected by infectious disease crises showed a tendency for economists to 
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overlook a country's vulnerability to infectious disease outbreaks, despite such 
assessments frequently recognizing in retrospect the damage caused by such 
events (Sands et al 2016).  
 
Several factors may contribute to this ‘blind spot’, including a lack of 
awareness amongst macroeconomists of the scale of infectious disease risk, a 
tendency to focus on near-term risks of economic stability and a lack of 
familiarity with bio-epidemiological inputs that might inform macroeconomic 
risk models. Another reason is that pandemics are rare events, making the 
prediction of their occurrence relatively difficult. Whatever the causes, the 
absence of infectious disease risks in macroeconomic assessments has the 
effect of depriving this area of the fiscal and policy attention that it warrants.  
 
For governments, and specifically ministries of finance, to appropriately 
prioritize investment in pandemic preparedness, the scale of risk associated 
with infectious disease crises must be made visible and salient. Historically, 
however, the risk associated with such outbreaks has been misperceived and 
mispriced in both national accounts and capital markets, where there have 
been notable market failures in risk pricing and transfer. Following the 
outbreak of SARS in 2004, for instance, disputes arose between firms and 
their insurers as to whether the resulting losses were covered by business 
continuity policies. Following legal action, most insurers agreed to cover some 
contingent losses; however, many then moved to explicitly exclude losses 
arising from infectious disease outbreaks from future cover (Reuters 2016).  
 
Sovereign Credit Rating 
 
The assessment of economic vulnerability to infectious disease outbreaks 
could be combined with other financial risks to the economy and be 
incorporated into a broader macroeconomic analysis. Credit rating agencies 
(see Box 6.1) do consider political instability and other socio-economic factors, 
but pay very little attention to a country’s susceptibility to heath emergencies. 
Increased government expenditures during infectious disease crises, coupled 
with decrease in revenue (from downturns in the economy), potentially affects 
the ability of governments to make interest payments on outstanding debt. 
Factoring in the overall assessment of country’s economic vulnerability and 
policy effectiveness to risk of pandemics (such as indicators of country’s 
intrinsic vulnerability to pandemics, state of preparedness, and composition 
of industry sector’s vulnerability to pandemics), the country’s credit rating 
would more accurately reflect the true hazard associated with purchases of a 
country’s debt. Such an approach has been previously used by UNDP in 
partnership with S&P to include Human Development Index (HDI) in 
devising sovereign ratings.  
 
Credit ratings are of critical importance to governments, as they affect the cost 
of borrowing in the marketplace. The World Bank estimates that a ratings 
downgrade to sub-investment grade by one major ratings agency increases 
Treasury bill yields by approximately 138 basis points on average (The World 
Bank 2016). Losing one’s rating or being downgraded thus has a huge effect 
on the country's ability to borrow money on the markets. Incorporation of 
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economic vulnerability to the risk of pandemics into assessments of credit 
ratings would incentivize governments to invest in health systems and 
pandemic preparedness to boost their credit ratings. Further, making the 
economic threat posed by infectious diseases more visible to policy-makers 
and the private sector will incentivize countries to mobilize the resources to 
prevent and mitigate such risks. 
 
Box 6.1 Sovereign Credit-Rating 
 
Credit ratings predate Bretton Woods institutions (Bhatia 2002). Perhaps the first instance of 
independent analysis of credit worthiness was the rating, following the 1907 financial crisis, of 
railroad bonds by John Moody in 1909. In 1913, the ratings began to use a letter-rating system 
and expanded to include industrial firms and utilities (Moody’s). Two other indices – predecessors 
of Standards & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch – were established in 1916 and 1924 respectively. Today, 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are known as the “Big Three” and control 95 percent of credit rating 
business for rating debt instruments (Alessi 2012). 
  
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) assess the default risk associated with a country’s debt (Kronwald 
2009). More specifically, the three main agencies – S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch – determine the 
extent to which a government will be able to meet its debt payment obligations, and assigns a 
rating ranging from investment-grade (low credit risk) to junk-grade (high-credit risk). Since these 
ratings provide public information and analysis of the risk level associated with country 
investments, countries are motivated to achieve high investment-grade ratings (S&P).  
 
Apart from macroeconomic factors, a country’s risk of default is also affected by socio-economic 
and political events such as war, political chaos, and deliberate decisions to hurt creditors 
(Moody’s 2008). CRAs vary in the extent to which they measure and incorporate such country-
level risk factors into their credit ratings. However, the three main CRAs consider political 
instability, natural catastrophes, security risks and the impact of socio-economic factors in their 
assessments of a country’s credit-worthiness. For instance, Fitch incorporates the United Nations 
Human Development Index as well as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business survey and 
Governance Indicators to determine the openness of the business environment and the condition 
of the human capital in the countries under consideration. Moody’s also incorporates governance 
indicators, sovereign country’s debt payment culture, security risks such as war, and effectiveness 
and stability of policy making as determinants of its sovereign rating (Tenant 2015) 
 
 
By providing an intuitive, quantitative metric for a complex and 
multidimensional concept, indices can focus public attention, provide 
policymakers with additional tools to prioritize countries that require 
attention, and identify potential weaknesses in underlying infrastructures and 
institutions that would benefit from investment. They can also be used to 
identify outliers – countries which overperform (or underperform) relative to 
national income or other metrics of interest – and to prioritize investments 
and capacity-building efforts accordingly. Lastly, indices can inform private 
sector assessments of risk, for example, risk to supply chains and potential for 
business interruption. Strong scores may benefit countries via increased 
investments, lowered cost of borrowing, or reduced premiums for parametric 
or other forms of catastrophe insurance, generating additional returns to 
investment in national and global public health. In summary, an index can 
assist both the public and private sectors in identifying weak points in global 
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preparedness, strengthen incentives to improve capacity, and help to mitigate 
the health and economic impacts of infectious disease outbreaks. 
 
The Downside of Indices 
 
There are several potential downsides to using indices to measure 
preparedness. First, data used for constructing the index may not be reliable 
and may be difficult to confirm, especially for developing countries. Second, 
the index may seem to be very arbitrary to some, especially to those countries 
that are likely to score poorly on them. Third, indices may create short-term 
adverse effects for poorly scoring countries, for instance if cross-border 
investments decline, or companies shift operations and supply chains away 
from areas of potential risk. These would need to be offset by donor 
commitment to help poorly scoring countries improve capacity and 
preparedness. Such a response may occur along a longer timescale, be 
financially inadequate, or not occur at all. Fourth, poorly scoring countries 
may bring political pressure against groups preparing such indices, leading to 
potential distortions or inaccuracies in scoring. This risk may be heightened 
in international organizations that lack adequate buffers between member 
state boards and operational/analytical functions. And fifth, countries could 
lose genuine engagement and goodwill if their poor JEE results are used in 
these indices. Therefore, a careful design of the index is essential to avoid 
introducing additional distortions or risks to some economies. In what 
follows, different aspects of what could be potentially measured in an index 
are discussed. 
 
Elements to be Addressed in Assessing Economic Vulnerability to 
Infectious Disease Outbreaks 
 
The factors determining a country’s overall economic vulnerability to 
infectious disease crises can be thought of as occurring across three distinct 
domains: intrinsic vulnerability, preparedness and response capacity, and 
industry sector vulnerability. The first two categories (intrinsic vulnerability 
and preparedness and response capacity) relate to the vulnerability of 
countries to experiencing the emergence and propagation of a pathogen 
through their populations. The third category relates to the vulnerability of a 
country’s economy to the shocks to labor supply, consumption and trade that 
occur following an outbreak. An effective methodology for risk assessment 
should identify and evaluate drivers of risk in each of these components and 




The first element, intrinsic risk, refers to the risk arising from environmental, 
demographic and sociological factors that predispose a country to the 
emergence and spread of infectious diseases. Patterns of environmental risk 
factors have been previously associated with the emergence of novel infectious 
disease agents in ‘hot spots’ of zoonotic transfer (Jones et al 2008). Factors 
such as latitude, wildlife biodiversity, co-densification of human and animal 
populations because of ecological transition, agricultural practices and land 
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use changes are all associated with increased risk of infectious diseases 
emerging in human populations (Morse et al 2012). Substantial academic and 
commercial efforts have already been put into developing spatial models of 
emerging infectious disease risk, for example, the work funded through 
USAID’s PREDICT program along with collaborative efforts between WHO 
and academic partners. Such efforts could form the basis of an intrinsic risk 
assessment mechanism for priority diseases and could be extended to provide 
a more general assessment of intrinsic risk.18  
 
In addition to these physical factors, societal and demographic factors also 
affect intrinsic risk through their effects on human susceptibility and disease 
transmission dynamics. Agricultural, nutritional and sociological practices 
can determine the nature and intensity of interactions at the human-animal 
interface that may predispose to zoonotic emergence. For example, hunting, 
butchering and consumption of bush meat and some livestock farming 
practices can predispose populations to zoonotic infections. Social factors 
such as trends in urbanization, migration and cultural practices around burial 
can all alter the propensity of infectious disease outbreaks to spread through 
a population. Population health factors such as the rates of 
immunocompromised, which is secondary to endemic diseases such as HIV, 
or adverse health factors such as malnutrition, can also affect susceptibility to 
infection, and thus may need to be reflected in assessments of intrinsic risk. 
Finally, population behavioral tendencies, relating to trust in governmental 
and public health institutions, can substantially influence public responses to 
infection control measures and public health communications.  
 
The final component of intrinsic risk is the underlying strength of local health 
systems. Strong health systems can improve the chances of routine pathogen 
discovery and outbreak suppression as infections may be identified in the 
routine course of health care delivery. Additionally, the effectiveness of all 
surveillance strategies is bolstered by adequate laboratory and human 
resources for health, capable of supporting pathogen discovery, case finding, 
treatment and delivery of vaccination interventions. Strong, equitable health 
systems can also be associated with higher levels of community engagement 
and trust in advance of disease crises, thus response activities can leverage 
pre-existing constructive relationships with communities. 
 
Preparedness and Response Capacity 
 
Global pandemic preparedness hinges on national systems capable of 
detecting and responding in a timely way to novel and emerging pathogens 
and potentially catastrophic outbreaks. The foundational importance of 
national institutions to global public health was recognized in the 2005 update 
to the IHR, which identified a set of basic requirements and responsibilities 
for governments to meet. Assessing how countries measure up is essential for 
                                                        
18 Currently such models incorporate historical analysis of specific infectious disease outbreaks to identify 
the factors associated with emergence of a specific disease. This understanding is then used to develop 
models that associate geographic distribution of relevant risk factors (e.g. presence of a suitable vector) 
with a predicted risk of emergence in a location. It may be possible to extend this approach to evaluate 
overall (rather than pathogen-specific risk), such that risk assessments reflect better the unknown 
unknowns associated with yet-to-emerge threats. 
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planning and investment at both the national and global levels. But such 
assessments have proven challenging in practice. 
 
In part, this reflects the complexity of the task. Epidemic and pandemic 
preparedness is demanding and requires a wide range of enabling systems and 
capabilities. Disease surveillance – a bedrock element of preparedness – 
illustrates the principle. Human and animal surveillance is essential to 
identify outbreak “sparks”, which are early cases that might cascade into a 
broader outbreak. Once an outbreak is underway, surveillance systems are 
critical to monitor disease transmission, identify hotspots and allocate public 
health resources. But surveillance systems do not function in isolation. They 
require effective primary health systems to screen and recognize potentially 
significant cases. They cannot work amidst violence and insecurity that 
impede movement and access to populations. And without financial resources 
to hire staff and fund field operations, they cannot be sustained.  
 
Sectoral and institutional interdependencies are not just a feature of disease 
surveillance. Other vital elements of pandemic preparedness similarly rely on 
capacities and factors beyond the scope of the health system. During the 2014-
15 West African Ebola crisis, outbreak response was constrained by weak 
infrastructure, which slowed and limited access to rural areas. Health 
communications aimed at changing behavioral practices were rejected by 
some communities, particularly in areas with weak trust in the state.  
 
These interdependencies receive limited consideration in existing assessment 
tools, including the GHSA and JEE, which instead focus detailed attention on 
the public health system and its legal and institutional framework. More 
holistic frameworks and metrics can help examine the underlying capacities 
that support – or constrain – national capacity to detect and mitigate public 
health threats. 
 
Several efforts are underway to develop indexes that capture the preparedness 
status of countries. The Metabiota Preparedness Index, developed in 2015, 
measures national capacity to detect and respond to epidemic and pandemic 
outbreaks. The design of the index and selection of indicators was informed 
by a multidisciplinary team, with expertise in epidemiology, veterinary and 
clinical medicine, political economy, virology, behavioral health, and other 
disciplines. The resulting framework is multidimensional, consisting of five 
sub-indices measuring factors that influence a country’s overall preparedness: 
public health infrastructure, physical and communications infrastructure, 
bureaucratic and public management capacities, financial resources to 
underwrite disease response, and risk communication. The sub-indices are 
weighted and combined into a composite score and rank, measuring the 
relative capacity of 188 countries.  
 
The resulting distribution provides a picture of the geography of preparedness 
for epidemic and pandemic outbreaks. It identifies countries which are 
unprepared to mitigate and contain a public health threat, as well as regions 
with weak preparedness where outbreaks are more likely to sustain and 
spread across borders. The results of the index show that preparedness is 
relatively weaker in West and Central Africa and areas within Southeast Asia 
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(Exhibit 6.1). Preparedness scores are highest among wealthy, industrialized 
countries in Western Europe and North America. However, analysis of the 
index results also find that GDP and other proxies for national wealth are 
imperfect predictors of preparedness, with many countries over-performing 
relative to national income.  
 
Exhibit 6.1 Global Distribution of Pandemic Preparedness  




The Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index, designed in 2016 by Rand 
Corporation, helps identify countries that are most vulnerable to disease 
outbreaks (Moore et al 2016). Developed initially as a tool for the U.S. 
government and international agencies, the index uses data from sources such 
as the World Bank, WHO and others to organize the factors that influence 
vulnerability into seven broad domains: demographic; health care; public 
health; disease dynamics; political-domestic; political-international, and; 
economic. The various indicators developed in each domain are weighted and 
summed into one composite index. The country scores so computed suggest 
that 22 out of the world’s 25 most vulnerable countries are in the Africa region, 
the other three being Afghanistan, Yemen and Haiti. Somalia ranked the most 
vulnerable country in the world, followed by the Central African Republic, 
both of which play host to a dangerous combination of political instability and 
compromised health systems. 
 
More recently, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the Center for Health 
Security at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), are developing a Global Health Security 
(GHS) Index, which will assess a country’s technical, financial, economic and 
political capabilities to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to epidemic 
threats with international implications, whether naturally occurring, 
deliberate, or accidental. The GHS Index draws from internationally-accepted 
technical assessments, but also incorporates other important factors, such as 
countries’ overall health system strength, commitment to global norms, socio-
economic circumstances, and other risk environment factors. The GHS Index 
is intended to provide a public benchmarking of global health security 
conditions – building on the JEE, modelling many of the lessons learned from 
NTI’s successful Nuclear Materials Security Index, and informed by an 
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international expert advisory group. The GHS Index is also designed to 
promote dialogue around commitments, public-private partnerships to assist 
countries, and independent monitoring and oversight. The pilot phase of the 
GHS Index is expected to be completed in 2017.   
 
Economic Vulnerability arising from Industrial Structure  
of National Economies 
 
When infectious disease outbreaks occur, they can affect economic activity 
through both labor shocks to industrial sectors and through reductions in 
consumption and trade. Outbreaks may affect certain industrial sectors more 
than others, for example those related to travel, tourism and in the case of 
regional outbreaks, those that rely on globalized supply chains. Empirical 
study of the effects of previous outbreaks on consumption combined with 
structural modelling of national economies can provide insight into the likely 
range of industrial and trade effects that may result from an infectious disease 
accident. Whilst piecemeal analysis of previous outbreaks has been 
undertaken by academics, there is a lack of any systematic assessment to 
inform economic models of structural vulnerability. Developing such analyses 
is likely to be within the competencies of the World Bank, regional 
development banks, the IMF and (where capacity exists), ministries of 
finance. Indeed, supporting ministries of finance to develop estimates of 
sectoral vulnerability, possibly augmented with simulation exercises that 
bring together assessments of intrinsic risk and prevention capacity, could be 
of great value. In doing this, the World Bank, regional development banks and 
IMF can help build both capacity and awareness of pandemic risk in finance 
ministries that may encourage countries to commit to fiscal measures that 
reduce their macroeconomic vulnerability to such risk.  
 
IMF Article IV Staff Reports 
 
IMF country surveillance under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of 
Agreement—often referred to as Article IV consultations—is an ongoing 
process that culminates in regular (usually annual) comprehensive 
consultations with individual member countries, with discussions in between 
as needed. During an Article IV consultation, an IMF team of economists visits 
a country to assess economic and financial developments and discuss the 
country's economic and financial policies with government and central bank 
officials. IMF staff missions also often meet with parliamentarians and 
representatives of business, labor unions, and civil society. The team reports 
its findings to IMF management and then presents them for discussion to the 
Executive Board, which represents all of the IMF's member countries. A 
summary of the Board's views is subsequently transmitted to the country's 
government. In this way, the views of the global community and the lessons of 
international experience are brought to bear on national policies. 
  
We believe that Article IV consultations provide an excellent opportunity for 
the IMF to underscore the salience of the economic impact of pandemics, 





The IMF, however, lacks the expertise to assess the risks of infectious disease 
outbreaks and thus assessments or indexes, as the one discussed previously in 
this chapter, will need to be taken by an official UN agency (or similar) for the 
IMF to include them in its Article IV consultations. 
 
Recommendation 10:  To reinforce incentives for national governments to invest 
in preparedness, the IMF and World Bank should work to facilitate the 
incorporation of the economic risks of infectious disease outbreaks into 
macroeconomic and market assessments, including: (i) inclusion into Article IV 
assessments where such risks are macro-critical; (ii) encouraging the 
development of academic and private sector indices and maps of intrinsic risk, 
preparedness and economic vulnerability. 
 
Incorporating Assessment of Pandemic Preparedness in Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessments 
 
Countries are likely to pay more attention to investing in preparedness if it 
increases access to concessional international finance. One way of doing so is 
by introducing an assessment of preparedness as a criterion in Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), a tool that the World Bank uses to 
determine the allocation of IDA resources to countries (Box 6.2). 
 
The CPIA is carried out over two phases to address fairness in country 
comparisons. First, a benchmarking phase is carried out to select a sample of 
countries representing each region which allows for normative adjustment in 
the rating scale. The intention is to allow for countries to progress with the 
indicator to a degree relative to their size or economy. The second stage uses 
the established benchmarks in combination with the 16 criteria to assess 
country profiles. Each year’s ratings are independent of assessment in 
previous years, and focus on policies and performance over intentions and 
promises. Each criterion is rated separately on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 6 
(highest), and to fully underscore the importance of the CPIA in the IDA 
Performance Based Allocations, the overall country score is referred to as the 
IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI). A consultative process is also carried 
out before assessment with IDA-eligible countries. 
 
Box 6.2 The Performance-Based Allocation System for IDA18 
 
The Country Performance Rating (CPR) of IDA countries are assessed annually using the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. The CPIA assesses each country’s 
policy and institutional framework and consists of 16 criteria grouped into four equally weighted 
clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; (iii) policies for social inclusion and 
equity; and (iv) public sector management and institutions. To ensure that the ratings are 
consistent with performance within and across regions: (i) detailed questions and definitions are 
provided to country teams for each of the rating levels for each of the 16 criteria; and (ii) a World 
Bank-wide process of rating and vetting a dozen “benchmark” countries is carried out to anchor 
the ratings in all IDA regions. This is followed by a process of institutional review of all country 






A. Economic Management 
 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies; Fiscal Policy; Debt Policy and Management 
B. Structural Policies  
 Trade; Financial Sector; Business Regulatory Environment  
C. Policies for Social Inclusion  
 Gender Equality; Equity of Public Resource Use; Building Human Resources; Social        
 Protection and Labor; Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability 
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions  
 Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; Quality of Budgetary and Financial 
 Management; Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization; Quality of Public Administration; 
 Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector 
 
In addition to the CPIA, the IDA Portfolio Performance Rating (PPR), which captures the quality 
of management of IDA’s projects and programs, enters the calculation of the CPR. The CPR in 
IDA18 will be calculated as: 
Country Performance Rating = (0.24 * CPIAA-C + 0.68 * CPIAD + 0.08* PPR) 
 
where CPIAA-C is the average of the ratings of CPIA clusters A to C, and CPIAD is the rating 
of CPIA cluster D. 
 
Country performance (with an exponent of 3 in the allocation formula) is the main determinant 
of IDA country allocations. Country needs are also considered through population size and GNI 
per capita. Population affects allocations positively (with an exponent of 1) while the level of 
GNI per capita is negatively related to allocations (with an exponent of -0.125).  
 




Health does not have its own distinctive criteria, but is captured to various 
degrees in the other indicators. Gender equality assesses access to healthcare 
during delivery, family planning, and adolescent fertility rate as one-third of 
the component; equity of public resource use contains health as one of many 
listed public resources; building human resources allocates half the weight to 
health and includes the most detailed and explicit assessment of health 
outcomes, especially population and reproductive health, nutrition and 
prevention and treatment of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria. 
 
For all IDA-eligible countries, the World Bank discloses: (i) the scores for the 
16 criteria; (ii) the cluster averages; and (iii) the overall score (IRAI). The 
write-ups that provide the rationale for the ratings, and the sub-ratings that 
help determine the scores of some of the criteria are, however, not disclosed. 
The scores of IBRD countries are not disclosed and are used for Bank’s 
internal purposes only. 
 
Introducing an assessment of pandemic preparedness has two benefits. First, 
the fact that countries are being assessed – and the results disclosed – on 
pandemic preparedness will raise its visibility, profile and importance. 
Second, countries that do well on this assessment will be able to increase their 
allocations of concessional finance through IDA. The Country Performance 
Rating system directs more resources to countries that are performing better. 
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During IDA15 (ending 2011), for instance, IDA countries in the top 
performance quintile received about 2.7 times in allocations per capita than 
those in the lowest quintile. 
 
Recommendation 11: The World Bank should include assessment of pandemic 
preparedness capacity in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
tool and include the rating in the overall country score used as part of the IDA 
allocation formula. Other multilateral development banks should consider 
introducing equivalent mechanisms to incentivize investment in preparedness. 
 
In 2013 the World Bank adopted a new World Bank Group Strategy focused 
on aligning all the institutions work with the twin goals of ending extreme 
poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustained manner. Shortly after, 
the Bank introduced Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCD), a diagnostic 
exercise to identify key challenges and opportunities for a country to 
accelerate progress towards development objectives that are consistent with 
the twin goals. This diagnostic is a reference point for client consultations on 
priorities for World Bank Group country engagement. As of June 30, 2014, 
SCD is required prior to sending a Country Partnership Framework (CPF) to 
the World Bank Board for approval and acceptance. Given the CPF timeframe, 
the SCD focuses on identifying country development priorities for the next 4-
6 years.  
 
The SCD stimulates an open and forward-looking dialogue between the Bank, 
client governments, the private sector, and the broader public. Not only does 
it identify priorities through which a country may most effectively and 
sustainably achieve the poverty reduction and shared prosperity goals, it also 
provides a valuable input into the policy debate and discourse within a country 
for the government’s own development planning process. In this way, the SCD 
both uses and influences the development vision spelled out by the country 
authorities and stakeholders to support the dialogue on reducing extreme 
poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner at the 
country level.  
 
The content of the SCD is context specific for the country; however, all discuss 
the challenges with respect to achieving the country’s development goals, 
identify the critical factors driving or constraining economic growth, identify 
the critical factors determining the inclusiveness of growth, analyze the 
environmental, social and fiscal sustainability of the current pattern of  
growth, distribution and poverty reduction, and identify and select a set of 
priorities or focus areas for a country, in order to maximize its progress toward 
achieving the twin goals. When completed, the SCD feeds into the CPF 
process, which eventually influences the areas for which the country can 
borrow or get grants from the Bank. 
 
Pandemics directly influence economic growth, poverty reduction, and 
longer-term sustainability of these trends. Not only does the impact of a 
pandemic represent a significant obstacle to the sustained reduction of 
poverty, a country’s pandemic preparedness can have important future 
impacts on poverty. Incorporating an assessment of a country’s pandemic 
preparedness in the Bank’s Systematic Country Diagnostics will emphasize its 
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importance and give the issue greater visibility in the eyes of policy makers. 
Further, it will help countries make a strong case for concessional Bank 
financing in support of investments in pandemic preparedness.  
 
Recommendation 12: The World Bank should incorporate analysis of pandemic 
preparedness in country-specific Systematic Country Diagnostics that identify a 
set of priorities through which a country may most effectively and sustainably 
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7. Conclusion: Health Security in Dollars 
and Cents 
 
We know that it is only a matter of time before the next pandemic hits us. We 
also know that there is a good chance that it will be severe. It may mean death 
on a slow fuse, spreading insidiously through populations, unrecognized for 
years, like HIV in the 1980s. Or it may strike people down with stark violence 
and lightning speed, plunging national economies abruptly into chaos, like 
Ebola in West Africa in 2014-15. Whatever its mode of attack, the next large-
scale, lethal pandemic is at most only decades away.  
 
Even if we escape the terrifying prospect of lethal pandemic of global scope, 
the possibility that any of the outbreaks or epidemics that are occurring all the 
time might become such a pandemic can still cost many lives and cause huge 
disruption to economies and societies. The economic impact of infectious 
disease outbreaks is caused by the contagion of fear. And in our 24-hour 
media, highly interdependent world, fear spreads extraordinarily rapidly. 
 
This time, though, the world can be better prepared, and communities and 
economies can be better protected. In the wake of Ebola and with the 
introduction of the JEE mechanism and other initiatives, countries and 
development partners are taking steps to improve their readiness to counter 
infectious disease outbreaks. There is much still to do, but given the technical 
and analytic tools that are being developed, the management frameworks, and 
the collaborative structures to facilitate regional cooperation we are better 
placed than ever to make universal health security a reality.  
 
The time to act is now, not only for national governments, but also for the 
international development partners. Exhibit 7.1 lists a series of actions that 
need to be taken by different stakeholders, which – collectively and severally 
– will make the world a safer place for everybody. 
 
Of course, the money has to be there, too. Otherwise, unfortunately, none of 
the assessments and plans will matter. Between achieving real health security 
and aspirational rhetoric, the difference is dollars. This is the challenge the 
IWG has sought to address with this report. We are well aware that others 
have called for better funding of preparedness before with limited success. Yet 
we hope that three differences make this report more likely to have success: 
first, the recommendations are specific and time bound: second, they are 
practical and supported by tools; and third, the recommendations include 
mechanisms to change policy makers’ incentives. Our report confirms the 
critical importance of pandemic preparedness for countries’ economic future. 
It sets out a step-by-step plan for countries to secure the financing they will 
need. Our 12 recommendations define an integrated framework for action by 
countries and development partners, with clear timelines. If countries and the 
global community adopt the framework, we will see nations at all levels of 






In a highly mobile, densely interconnected, and warming world, there are 
reasons to believe that pandemic threats today are greater than ever. But so 
are our knowledge and capabilities for preparedness and response. Not “pie in 
the sky,” universal health security is now an achievable goal. However, goals 
come at a price. We must break the cycle of panic and neglect. The sums are 
not large relative to the risks. The returns on investment are extraordinarily 
high. We must secure commitments to sustained financing and monitor that 
these are delivered. Otherwise we will continue to see the most vulnerable 
countries being afflicted by outbreaks that cause terrible loss of life and knock 
them off their development trajectory. Otherwise we put the world at risk of 
some highly contagious deadly influenza or other virus that could kill millions 
and wipe trillions from the global economy. We all have a stake in global 
security. Investing in national preparedness is the most cost-effective way to 







APPENDIX A – GUIDANCE FOR PLANNING  
 
Following the momentum gained on the JEE assessments in the countries, the 
WHO has started to work with countries on the creation of National Action 
Plans (NAPHS). A guidance for the completion of NAPHS has been issued 
(WHO 2017) and is being refined as the planning exercises continue in more 
countries. 
 
This section and the documents linked to it pursue the following objectives: 
 
(i) Outline some basic guiding principles for the creation of NAPHS that have 
been compiled through interviews with several global and regional entities 
and representatives of the countries 
(ii) Give the countries an example of planning template and actions suggested to 
fill gaps identified in the JEE19 
 
Guiding principles to ensure successful financing and execution of the NAPHS 
 
 Integrate the plan in existing processes, instead of making it a standalone plan 
- The national action plan for health security (NAPHS) should include and 
coordinate relevant existing national plans related to emergencies, such 
as pandemic preparedness plans, PIP national plans, plans for national 
disasters, IHR national plans 
- Planned activities should be integrated into countries’ existing planning 
and budgeting processes (e.g., national health plan, security plan, human 
resources development, etc.) 
- Action against antimicrobial resistance is part of the NAPHS and as such 
synergies between both plans should be highlighted 
 
 Base the plan on best practices and guidelines, but tailor it to the specific country 
needs 
- Activities outlined in the NAPHS should aim at filling the main gaps 
identified in the diagnostic (including the JEE and PVS assessments), but 
prioritization should be given to the gaps that represent the biggest 
vulnerabilities for the country (e.g., there may be a gap in capacities 
related to radiation risk, but also no radiation sources in the country). 
Additionally, not all missing capacities necessarily need to be built in the 
country; in some cases, especially for smaller countries with limited 
resources, the action could be granting access to capacities present at the 
regional level or in a partnering country 
- The NAPHS should draw from existing supporting tools (e.g., planning 
template, costing tools), but it needs to be tailored to the country’s 
specific needs, peculiarities and costs 
- Best practices should be shared across countries; this could mean 
including representatives from countries that already went through the 
                                                        
19 The links mentioned in this section will be activated and made available for use with the final publication 
of this report. 
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planning process (e.g. Tanzania, Pakistan, Eritrea) in the planning process 
or partnering countries with similar characteristics 
 
 Create the plan with the right stakeholder 
- Countries are the owners of the NAPHS and all relevant 
stakeholders/key decision makers from the country leadership should be 
involved in the planning process (e.g., Ministries of health, agriculture, 
defense, finance, prime minister office, etc.) 
- The Ministry of Finance should be involved from the beginning, in order 
to facilitate integration in the budgeting and planning processes and for 
cross-sectoral coordination 
- A few main donors could take part to the planning process in order to 
clarify high level commitments and coordinate efforts (e.g. avoid 
duplication of efforts on certain technical areas and gaps in others) 
 
 Ensure sufficient detail in costing to enable subsequent domestic budgeting and 
donor engagement 
 
Example of planning template 
 
The template (link to be provided) gives an example of a country planning tool, 
with suggested actions to fill gaps in each technical area. It has been built 
based on existing planning guidelines and other examples of tools and 
strategies. These include the WHO Country Planning Guide and Matrix, WHO 
Country Planning checklist, CDC Milestones Library, and other relevant 
global publications. Regional strategies were also considered in the 
development of the country planning template. 
 
This template is designed to also facilitate countries prioritization of their 
planned activities and link these to costing, thus enhancing country 
ownership, leadership and accountability. 
 
The WHO will continue to review and enhance the template for further 
alignment with other key critical indicators and areas such as health systems. 
After piloting, WHO should share the final tool with Member States and 




APPENDIX B – INTEGRATION/OVERLAP OF ACTION ON 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE AND HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
PREPAREDNESS 
 
Action on Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and health emergencies preparedness 
Infectious disease emergencies and AMR have mutual influence: infectious 
diseases preparedness decreases the incidence of infections and therefore 
pressure for AMR, while decrease of antimicrobial resistance decreases the 
risk of infectious outbreaks and provides better chances to contain upcoming 
outbreaks. 
 
Some of the activities described in the JEE and national health plans for health 
security and in the AMR national action plans are therefore partly overlapping 
and synergistic. These include most prevention and detection activities. Both 
health emergencies preparedness and AMR also require specific activities and 











APPENDIX C – REGIONAL LOSS ESTIMATES OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
OUTBREAKS AND AMR 
 
Estimates of the projected economic impact of infectious disease crises have 
helped make the case for global action. Although such estimates have been 
helpful in focusing the attention of the international community on pandemic 
risk, the tendency to present figures at a global scale limits the ability of 
national and regional stakeholders to appreciate the implications of these 
risks for their local contexts. To support the development of the case for 
investment at the regional and national level we have prepared preliminary 
estimates of the expected annual economic loss associated with pandemic 




We use estimates previously calculated by Fan, Jamison and Summers (2015) 
of the expected economic losses arising from pandemic influenza as the basis 
for our estimates. The primary advantage of using these estimates (as 
compared to others in the literature) is that they include both the direct and 
mortality-inclusive costs of pandemic outbreaks and thus better capture the 
totality of economic damage arising from pandemics. Additionally, Fan, 
Jamison and Summers (2015) not only report estimates of annualized impact 
of pandemic influenza at the global level (using 2015 economic and 
demographic data), but also disaggregate the expected impact by World Bank 
income group (i.e., low, lower middle, upper middle and high income 
countries).  
 
This disaggregation allows us to estimate country-level losses by assigning 
these losses to countries in proportion to their share of total GDP within a 
given income grouping;21 so for example, a low-income country that 
accounted for 5 percent of the total GDP for low income countries in 2015 
would be allocated 5 percent of the expected economic losses. These country 
level estimates are then aggregated to regional estimates by summing the 
expected economic losses of all countries making up a defined geographic 
region.  
 
Although we report only point estimates for pandemic economic losses at each 
level of estimation, it is important to acknowledge the considerable 
uncertainty inherent in any estimation approach. Fan and colleagues attempt 
to reflect uncertainty around their estimates by applying an estimation range 
of ±40 percent around each point estimate. These estimate ranges do not 
correspond to estimation intervals as might be classically derived using 
statistical or econometric methods, but rather represent the authors’ attempts 
                                                        
20 Expected loss is the average annual economic losses arising from pandemics over an extended period. 
For example, if estimates suggest that we would typically expect to see 3 pandemics in the next 100 years 
that between them would cause $60 trillion of economic damage, we would calculate the expected 
economic loss by dividing the total loss figure by 100 to give us an expected annual loss of $600 billion.  
21 All GDP and population data are derived from the World Bank data bank - 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD for GDP 
and http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL for population. Countries with less than 
100,000 population or with 4+ missing years of GDP data are excluded from the following analyses. 
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to communicate a reasonable level of uncertainty around their estimates. We 
do not reproduce these ranges around the country-level estimates presented 
here, but we would similarly counsel keeping this fundamental uncertainty in 
mind. 
 
Advantages and limitations of estimation method 
 
Although our “top down” approach of interpolating from global estimates is 
necessarily rough in its approach, it does have the benefit of producing rapid 
estimates for the vast number of countries where more detailed ‘bottom up’ 
estimates are not available. The drawback of such an approach however is that 
it will miss much of the local context that might affect country-level estimates 
of the economic damage caused by infectious disease outbreaks. As such our 
figures should not be taken as definitive but in the absence of more detailed 
local assessments might be considered a reasonable base case.  
 
Wherever possible we encourage the development of detailed national and 
regional estimates that take into account relevant local factors in their 
estimation models, as discussed in the section 6 of the main report. The 
estimates below are intended to provide a rough sense of the scale of the threat 
posed by pandemic outbreaks at the regional and national levels and should 
be thought of as starting points for framing the economic case for investing in 
preparedness. They are neither intended to be definitive nor should they be 
used as the basis of comparative risk assessment between countries for the 
purposes of directing investment or lending. 
 
Another important limitation of our approach is that it is based solely on 
estimates of economic losses expected to arise as a result of pandemic 
influenza. As such is it does not capture the expected economic impact of other 
pathogens that have previously caused significant economic damage, such as 
SARS, MERS, Ebola and Zika. It also does not capture the effect of outbreaks 
that occur at a smaller scale than full blown pandemics or of the effects of 
emerging diseases becoming endemic (as happened with HIV). For these 
reasons, the estimates might be viewed as conservative in their relationship to 
the true economic costs of infectious disease crises. Clarifying this will be of 
particular importance when presenting these figures as part of any efforts to 




We calculate expected economic loss for six distinct geographic regions shown 
in Exhibit C1 and present these regional estimates in Table C1. We also report 




Recent estimates of the potentially extreme economic impacts of infectious 
disease crises have undoubtedly bolstered the case for greater investments in 
preparedness. However, the consistent focus of these reports on global-level 
costs may leave policy-makers within national governments without a clear 
sense of regional or country-specific impacts. Given that these actors 
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ultimately bear the responsibility for addressing these risks, it is important to 
provide them with the most individually tailored information possible. The 
work described here should be treated as only a first step in this process, 
primarily highlighting a need for higher-resolution estimates on the impact of 
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East Asia & Pacific 2.23 21.2 196.9 0.9 
Europe & Central Asia 0.89 20.1 110.3 0.5 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
0.63 5.4 59.4 1.1 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
0.46 3.1 27.8 0.9 
North America 0.36 19.6 86.5 0.4 
South Asia 1.74 2.7 53.3 2.0 
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& Caribbean 
North America 
Middle East  
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Table C2 Estimated country level vulnerability to economic losses from pandemics 
Country Region Income group 2015 Population 2015 GDP ($) 
Expected annual 









c loss (% 
GNI) 
Afghanistan South Asia Low income 32,526,562 $19,331,286,549 $399,244,953 $12.27 2.06 
Albania Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
2,889,167 $11,398,392,444 $128,538,789 $44.49 1.13 
Algeria 




39,666,519 $165,000,000,000 $1,858,200,019 $46.85 1.13 
Angola Sub-Saharan Africa 
Upper middle 
income 
25,021,974 $103,000,000,000 $1,157,316,729 $46.25 1.12 
Argentina 




43,416,755 $585,000,000,000 $6,593,740,655 $151.87 1.13 
Armenia Europe & Central Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
3,017,712 $10,529,182,498 $209,002,797 $69.26 1.99 
Aruba 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 103,889 $2,584,463,687 $11,412,415 $109.85 0.44 
Australia East Asia & Pacific High income 23,781,169 $1,340,000,000,000 $5,913,343,604 $248.66 0.44 
Austria Europe & Central Asia High income 8,611,088 $377,000,000,000 $1,664,527,138 $193.30 0.44 
Azerbaijan Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
9,651,349 $53,047,140,347 $598,208,493 $61.98 1.13 
Bahamas, 
The 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 388,019 $8,853,519,100 $39,095,166 $100.76 0.44 
Bahrain 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 1,377,237 $31,125,851,064 $137,444,817 $99.80 0.44 
Bangladesh South Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
160,995,642 $195,000,000,000 $3,872,290,808 $24.05 1.99 
Barbados 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 284,215 $4,385,250,000 $19,364,286 $68.13 0.44 
Belarus Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
9,513,000 $54,608,962,635 $615,821,042 $64.73 1.13 
Belgium Europe & Central Asia High income 11,285,721 $455,000,000,000 $2,009,558,289 $178.06 0.44 
Belize 




359,287 $1,752,861,128 $19,766,879 $55.02 1.13 
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 10,879,829 $8,290,986,804 $171,231,989 $15.74 2.07 
Bhutan South Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
774,830 $2,057,947,621 $40,849,972 $52.72 1.98 
Bolivia 




10,724,705 $32,997,684,515 $654,999,413 $61.07 1.98 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
3,810,416 $16,191,716,215 $182,592,730 $47.92 1.13 
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa 
Upper middle 
income 








207,847,528 $1,800,000,000,000 $20,339,621,339 $97.86 1.13 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
East Asia & Pacific High income 423,188 $12,930,394,938 $57,097,740 $134.92 0.44 
Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
7,177,991 $50,199,117,547 $566,091,560 $78.86 1.13 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 18,105,570 $10,678,201,939 $220,534,636 $12.18 2.07 
Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 11,178,921 $3,097,324,740 $63,968,390 $5.72 2.06 
Cabo Verde Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
520,502 $1,603,239,233 $31,824,074 $61.14 1.98 
Cambodia East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
15,577,899 $18,049,954,289 $358,289,063 $23.00 1.99 
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
23,344,179 $28,415,950,981 $564,052,644 $24.16 1.98 




Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 4,900,274 $1,583,776,760 $32,709,405 $6.68 2.07 
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 14,037,472 $10,888,798,114 $224,884,034 $16.02 2.07 
Chile 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 17,948,141 $241,000,000,000 $1,063,301,437 $59.24 0.44 
China East Asia & Pacific 
Upper middle 
income 
1,371,220,000 $11,100,000,000,000 $124,775,764,825 $91.00 1.12 
Colombia 




48,228,704 $292,000,000,000 $3,293,763,535 $68.29 1.13 
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 788,474 $565,689,764 $11,683,070 $14.82 2.07 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 77,266,814 $35,237,742,278 $727,757,604 $9.42 2.07 
Congo, Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
4,620,330 $8,553,154,506 $169,778,918 $36.75 1.99 
Costa Rica 




4,807,850 $54,136,834,091 $610,496,885 $126.98 1.13 
Côte d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
22,701,556 $31,759,248,868 $630,416,639 $27.77 1.99 
Croatia Europe & Central Asia High income 4,224,404 $48,732,003,674 $215,189,661 $50.94 0.44 
Cuba 




11,389,562 $87,132,800,000 $982,589,836 $86.27 1.13 
Cyprus Europe & Central Asia High income 1,165,300 $19,559,942,331 $86,372,343 $74.12 0.44 
Czech 
Republic 
Europe & Central Asia High income 10,551,219 $185,000,000,000 $817,607,605 $77.49 0.44 








887,861 $1,727,000,000 $34,280,708 $38.61 1.98 
Dominican 
Republic 




10,528,391 $68,102,618,092 $767,987,949 $72.94 1.13 
Ecuador 




16,144,363 $100,000,000,000 $1,129,688,269 $69.97 1.13 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 




91,508,084 $331,000,000,000 $6,565,916,788 $71.75 1.98 
El Salvador 










845,060 $12,202,323,684 $137,604,659 $162.83 1.13 
Eritrea Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 4,789,568 $2,607,739,837 $53,857,097 $11.24 2.06 
Estonia Europe & Central Asia High income 1,311,998 $22,459,443,274 $99,175,893 $75.59 0.44 
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 99,390,750 $61,539,711,687 $1,270,966,589 $12.79 2.07 
Fiji East Asia & Pacific 
Upper middle 
income 
892,145 $4,425,503,075 $49,906,055 $55.94 1.13 
Finland Europe & Central Asia High income 5,482,013 $232,000,000,000 $1,026,010,200 $187.16 0.44 
France Europe & Central Asia High income 66,808,385 $2,420,000,000,000 $10,681,058,025 $159.88 0.44 
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa 
Upper middle 
income 
1,725,292 $14,262,032,471 $160,831,835 $93.22 1.13 
Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 1,990,924 $938,794,719 $19,388,728 $9.74 2.07 
Georgia Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
3,679,000 $13,965,385,802 $157,486,574 $42.81 1.13 
Germany Europe & Central Asia High income 81,413,145 $3,360,000,000,000 $14,852,245,132 $182.43 0.44 
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
27,409,893 $37,543,361,204 $745,230,458 $27.19 1.99 
Greece Europe & Central Asia High income 10,823,732 $195,000,000,000 $860,418,563 $79.49 0.44 
Grenada 




106,825 $984,074,074 $11,097,327 $103.88 1.13 
Guam East Asia & Pacific High income 169,885 $5,734,000,000 $25,320,065 $149.04 0.44 
Guatemala 




16,342,897 $63,794,152,886 $1,266,304,993 $77.48 1.98 
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 12,608,590 $6,699,203,543 $138,357,227 $10.97 2.06 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 1,844,325 $1,056,776,883 $21,825,388 $11.83 2.06 
Guyana 








Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Low income 10,711,067 $8,765,329,890 $181,028,496 $16.90 2.07 
Honduras 




8,075,060 $20,420,967,149 $405,353,336 $50.20 1.99 
Hong Kong 
SAR, China 
East Asia & Pacific High income 7,305,700 $309,000,000,000 $1,365,512,799 $186.91 0.44 
Hungary Europe & Central Asia High income 9,844,686 $122,000,000,000 $537,466,297 $54.59 0.44 
Iceland Europe & Central Asia High income 330,823 $16,779,598,787 $74,094,966 $223.97 0.44 
India South Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
1,311,050,527 $2,090,000,000,000 $41,463,181,226 $31.63 1.98 
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
257,563,815 $862,000,000,000 $17,109,269,091 $66.43 1.98 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 




79,109,272 $425,000,000,000 $4,796,368,356 $60.63 1.13 
Iraq 




36,423,395 $180,000,000,000 $2,030,624,165 $55.75 1.13 
Ireland Europe & Central Asia High income 4,640,703 $284,000,000,000 $1,252,769,181 $269.95 0.44 
Israel 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 8,380,400 $299,000,000,000 $1,322,154,285 $157.77 0.44 
Italy Europe & Central Asia High income 60,802,085 $1,820,000,000,000 $8,043,337,795 $132.29 0.44 
Jamaica 




2,725,941 $14,262,190,323 $160,833,616 $59.00 1.13 
Japan East Asia & Pacific High income 126,958,472 $4,380,000,000,000 $19,354,703,829 $152.45 0.44 
Jordan 




7,594,547 $37,517,410,282 $423,080,930 $55.71 1.13 
Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
17,544,126 $184,000,000,000 $2,079,329,193 $118.52 1.13 
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
46,050,302 $63,398,041,540 $1,258,442,239 $27.33 1.99 
Kiribati East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
112,423 $160,121,929 $3,178,398 $28.27 1.98 
Korea, Rep. East Asia & Pacific High income 50,617,045 $1,380,000,000,000 $6,084,366,647 $120.20 0.44 
Kuwait 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 3,892,115 $114,000,000,000 $503,579,624 $129.38 0.44 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Europe & Central Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
5,957,000 $6,571,853,849 $130,450,378 $21.90 1.99 
Lao PDR East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
6,802,023 $12,369,080,043 $245,524,505 $36.10 1.99 
Latvia Europe & Central Asia High income 1,978,440 $27,002,832,428 $119,238,486 $60.27 0.44 
Lebanon 




5,850,743 $47,084,703,151 $530,970,550 $90.75 1.13 
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Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
2,135,022 $2,278,037,786 $45,218,731 $21.18 1.99 
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 4,503,438 $2,053,000,000 $42,400,173 $9.42 2.07 
Libya 




6,278,438 $34,699,395,524 $391,302,396 $62.32 1.13 
Lithuania Europe & Central Asia High income 2,910,199 $41,400,137,851 $182,813,776 $62.82 0.44 
Luxembourg Europe & Central Asia High income 569,676 $56,799,626,262 $250,814,483 $440.28 0.44 
Macao SAR, 
China 
East Asia & Pacific High income 587,606 $46,177,532,874 $203,909,687 $347.02 0.44 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
2,078,453 $10,086,021,261 $113,739,280 $54.72 1.13 
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 24,235,390 $9,738,652,322 $201,130,317 $8.30 2.07 
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 17,215,232 $6,403,820,949 $132,256,753 $7.68 2.06 
Malaysia East Asia & Pacific 
Upper middle 
income 
30,331,007 $296,000,000,000 $3,341,160,441 $110.16 1.13 
Maldives South Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
409,163 $3,435,244,659 $38,738,988 $94.68 1.13 
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 17,599,694 $12,746,688,962 $263,254,659 $14.96 2.07 
Malta 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 431,333 $9,746,478,873 $43,038,277 $99.78 0.44 
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
4,067,564 $5,442,297,174 $108,028,836 $26.56 1.99 
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa 
Upper middle 
income 
1,262,605 $11,681,761,261 $131,734,317 $104.34 1.13 
Mexico 




127,017,224 $1,140,000,000,000 $12,898,431,232 $101.55 1.13 
Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. 
East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
104,460 $314,971,100 $6,252,132 $59.85 1.98 
Moldova Europe & Central Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
3,554,150 $6,568,288,862 $130,379,613 $36.68 1.98 
Mongolia East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
2,959,134 $11,741,338,841 $233,063,930 $78.76 1.98 
Montenegro Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
622,388 $3,987,061,628 $44,961,785 $72.24 1.13 
Morocco 




34,377,511 $101,000,000,000 $1,996,756,951 $58.08 1.98 
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 27,977,863 $14,807,075,727 $305,807,389 $10.93 2.07 
Myanmar East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
53,897,154 $62,600,906,116 $1,242,619,212 $23.06 1.99 
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa 
Upper middle 
income 
2,458,830 $11,491,507,356 $129,588,838 $52.70 1.13 
 91 
 
Nepal South Asia Low income 28,513,700 $21,194,888,048 $437,733,519 $15.35 2.07 
Netherlands Europe & Central Asia High income 16,936,520 $750,000,000,000 $3,313,086,827 $195.62 0.44 
New Zealand East Asia & Pacific High income 4,595,700 $174,000,000,000 $767,258,916 $166.95 0.44 
Nicaragua 




6,082,032 $12,692,562,187 $251,945,580 $41.42 1.98 
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 19,899,120 $7,142,951,342 $147,521,856 $7.41 2.06 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
182,201,962 $487,000,000,000 $9,662,772,821 $53.03 1.98 
Norway Europe & Central Asia High income 5,195,921 $387,000,000,000 $1,707,042,239 $328.54 0.44 
Oman 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 4,490,541 $69,830,949,285 $308,357,899 $68.67 0.44 
Pakistan South Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
188,924,874 $271,000,000,000 $5,380,304,509 $28.48 1.99 
Panama 




3,929,141 $52,132,289,747 $587,891,793 $149.62 1.13 
Papua New 
Guinea 
East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
7,619,321 $16,928,680,397 $336,031,933 $44.10 1.98 
Paraguay 




6,639,123 $27,093,938,619 $305,536,247 $46.02 1.13 
Peru 




31,376,670 $189,000,000,000 $2,132,590,098 $67.97 1.13 
Philippines East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
100,699,395 $292,000,000,000 $5,805,111,360 $57.65 1.99 
Poland Europe & Central Asia High income 37,999,494 $477,000,000,000 $2,106,617,068 $55.44 0.44 
Portugal Europe & Central Asia High income 10,348,648 $199,000,000,000 $879,238,605 $84.96 0.44 
Puerto Rico 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 3,474,182 $103,000,000,000 $455,421,160 $131.09 0.44 
Qatar 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 2,235,355 $165,000,000,000 $727,017,940 $325.24 0.44 
Romania Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
2,235,355 $178,000,000,000 $2,006,773,474 $897.74 1.13 
Russian 
Federation 
Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
144,096,812 $1,370,000,000,000 $15,402,810,189 $106.89 1.12 
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 11,609,666 $8,095,980,014 $167,204,555 $14.40 2.06 
Samoa East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 






190,344 $317,696,179 $6,306,225 $33.13 1.98 
Saudi Arabia 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 31,540,372 $646,000,000,000 $2,852,600,770 $90.44 0.44 
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Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 15,129,273 $13,609,989,582 $281,084,223 $18.58 2.07 
Serbia Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
7,098,247 $37,160,332,465 $419,054,191 $59.04 1.13 
Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 6,453,184 $4,214,779,785 $87,046,951 $13.49 2.07 
Singapore East Asia & Pacific High income 5,535,002 $293,000,000,000 $1,292,670,142 $233.54 0.44 
Slovak 
Republic 
Europe & Central Asia High income 5,424,050 $87,263,622,047 $385,336,695 $71.04 0.44 
Slovenia Europe & Central Asia High income 2,063,768 $42,774,769,768 $188,883,844 $91.52 0.44 
Solomon 
Islands 
East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
583,591 $1,129,164,719 $22,413,761 $38.41 1.99 
Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 10,787,104 $5,925,000,000 $122,367,766 $11.34 2.06 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
Upper middle 
income 
77,266,814 $315,000,000,000 $3,547,404,077 $45.91 1.13 
South Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 12,339,812 $9,015,221,096 $186,189,446 $15.09 2.07 
Spain Europe & Central Asia High income 46,418,269 $1,190,000,000,000 $5,267,580,377 $113.48 0.44 
Sri Lanka South Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
20,966,000 $82,316,172,384 $1,633,964,484 $77.93 1.98 
St. Lucia 












109,462 $737,683,556 $8,318,800 $76.00 1.13 
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
40,234,882 $97,156,119,150 $1,928,535,348 $47.93 1.98 
Suriname 




542,975 $5,150,291,217 $58,079,435 $106.97 1.13 
Swaziland Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
1,286,970 $4,118,488,059 $81,751,411 $63.52 1.98 
Sweden Europe & Central Asia High income 9,798,871 $496,000,000,000 $2,188,874,162 $223.38 0.44 
Switzerland Europe & Central Asia High income 8,286,976 $671,000,000,000 $2,962,059,050 $357.44 0.44 
Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
8,481,855 $7,853,450,374 $155,889,889 $18.38 1.99 
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 53,470,420 $45,628,247,290 $942,350,496 $17.62 2.06 
Thailand East Asia & Pacific 
Upper middle 
income 
67,959,359 $395,000,000,000 $4,456,278,926 $65.57 1.13 
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 7,304,578 $4,087,903,913 $84,426,611 $11.56 2.07 
Tonga East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 







Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 1,360,088 $23,559,287,484 $104,032,560 $76.49 0.44 
Tunisia 




11,107,800 $43,015,089,723 $853,843,502 $76.87 1.99 
Turkey Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
78,665,830 $718,000,000,000 $8,095,477,153 $102.91 1.13 
Turkmenista
n 
Europe & Central Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
5,373,502 $35,854,571,429 $404,329,225 $75.25 1.13 
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 39,032,383 $27,529,249,701 $568,555,744 $14.57 2.07 
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
45,198,200 $90,615,023,324 $1,798,695,512 $39.80 1.99 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Middle East & North 
Africa 
High income 9,156,963 $370,000,000,000 $1,635,144,558 $178.57 0.44 
United 
Kingdom 
Europe & Central Asia High income 65,138,232 $2,860,000,000,000 $12,633,935,401 $193.96 0.44 
United 
States 
North America High income 321,418,820 $18,000,000,000,000 $79,645,603,339 $247.79 0.44 
Uruguay 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 3,431,555 $53,442,697,569 $235,991,034 $68.77 0.44 
Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia 
Lower middle 
income 
31,299,500 $66,732,736,498 $1,324,635,466 $42.32 1.98 
Vanuatu East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
4,422,143 $742,432,131 $14,737,174 $3.33 1.98 
Venezuela, 
RB 




31,108,083 $371,000,000,000 $4,187,538,585 $134.61 1.13 
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific 
Lower middle 
income 
91,703,800 $194,000,000,000 $3,842,913,015 $41.91 1.98 
Virgin Islands 
(U.S.) 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
High income 103,574 $3,765,000,000 $16,625,400 $160.52 0.44 
Yemen, Rep. 




77,266,814 $37,733,919,936 $749,013,022 $9.69 1.98 
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 
Lower middle 
income 
16,211,767 $21,154,394,546 $419,911,767 $25.90 1.98 
Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 15,602,751 $14,419,185,900 $297,796,382 $19.09 2.07 
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